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3 
CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
Human rights discourse, when talking 
about trafficking, is the shorthand 
reminder that people, not only states, 
are harmed by this practice.
1
 
 
It is with this quote in mind that this thesis attempts to address the issue of human 
trafficking from a human rights perspective, and seeks redress for victims of trafficking 
beyond the realm of criminal law.  The aim of the enquiry is to establish whether 
trafficking victims could find protection within a particular human rights framework – 
that of refugee law – and to assess any factors that may hinder qualification for such 
protection. 
Although this thesis will spend a considerable amount of time looking at the 
definitions of ‘human trafficking’ and ‘refugee’, the aim is not to compare the two 
definitions or find similarities between them.  This would be a futile task because the 
definitions use completely different terminology, are structured differently and were 
drafted to achieve different objectives.  The definition of ‘human trafficking’ was 
drafted in order to establish elements and set parameters for prohibited conduct, while 
the definition of ‘refugee’ was drafted in order to set parameters for the bestowment of 
persons with a particular legal status.  Thus, while ‘human trafficking’ serves to define 
a criminal offence, the definition for ‘refugee’ describes a particular type of person.  
The content dealt with by each definition is thus dissimilar and incapable of word for 
word comparison. 
Instead, this thesis will endeavour to establish similarities between the people 
that are associated with each of the concepts.  This will be done from the perspective of 
                                                 
1
 ‘Trafficking in hegemony’ in Catherine Dauvergne Making people illegal: what globalization means 
for migration and law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 69, hereafter referred to as 
‘Dauvergne’ at 73. 
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4 
the victims of human trafficking.  In particular, what will be attempted is a 
demonstration that in South Africa the status enjoyed by persons who are categorised 
as ‘refugees’ can also be enjoyed by persons who are categorised as ‘victims of human 
trafficking’.  In other words, it will be assessed whether the concept ‘victim of human 
trafficking’ can be included within the concept ‘refugee’.  The two definitions linked to 
these concepts will play important, albeit different, roles in this analysis.  The 
definition of ‘trafficking’ will be used to facilitate the task of recognising and 
describing the victims of trafficking.  However, the conception of ‘trafficking’ also 
presents certain challenges to the qualification of trafficking victims for refugee status, 
and these will also be identified.  Thereafter, the definition of ‘refugee’ will provide the 
criteria according to which it will be assessed whether or not trafficking victims can 
meet the requirements for refugee status in South Africa.  Throughout, a victim-centred 
approach will be taken, as opposed to an approach that concentrates on the offenders of 
human trafficking. 
The following chapter (Chapter 2) will attempt to establish links between 
trafficking victims and refugees, by looking at the necessity for and availability of 
protection to victims of trafficking in South Africa, in relation to refugees.  Thereafter, 
the definition of trafficking, both internationally and in South Africa, will be discussed 
and analysed (Chapter 3).  Chapter 4 then draws on the notion of trafficking, as 
contained in the definitions, to determine the nature of human trafficking as an offence, 
its likely perpetrators and its effects on victims.  By using the deductions made in the 
previous chapter, Chapter 5 assesses whether a victim of trafficking fulfils the 
requirements for refugee status in South Africa.  Finally, factors obstructing trafficking 
victims’ qualification for refugee status will be discussed.  Some of these factors arise 
from the conception of ‘trafficking’ examined in Chapter 3, while others arise from 
limitations that ordinarily operate within refugee law. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Establishing links between victims of human trafficking and refugees 
 
1 AN INTRODUCTION TO HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
Many authors refer to human trafficking as ‘modern-day slavery’
2
 – a contemporary 
form of servitude which does not entail legal ownership of one person by another, but 
nonetheless results in a relationship of complete control over the former’s freedom and 
survival.
3
  Human beings are said to be treated as expendable objects by traffickers – 
used and sold repeatedly for profit until they are broken or no longer of any worth.
4
   
Human trafficking takes on many exploitative forms.  The most profitable form 
of trafficking is sexual exploitation of women and children, which often entails forced 
marriages, prostitution and pornography.
5
  Frequently, persons are trafficked to be used 
as labourers in domestic settings,
6
 brothels, construction sites, sweatshops, mines, 
plantations or farms; or persons are coerced into begging for the benefit of their 
traffickers.
7
  In these contexts employment conditions are usually sub-standard, 
dangerous and unhealthy, with little or no wage payments.
8
  Human trafficking can also 
occur in order to supply human organs for sale on the black market.
9
  Where traffickers 
are involved in drug smuggling, victims of human trafficking are sometimes used as 
drug mules to transport illegal drugs into other countries.
10
  Finally, human trafficking 
                                                 
2
 Rika Snyman ‘Victims of human trafficking’ in Linda Davis and Rika Snyman (eds) Victimology in 
South Africa (Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers, 2005) 280, hereafter referred to as ‘Snyman’, at 280; Jane 
N Sigmon ‘Combating modern-day slavery: issues in identifying and assisting victims of human 
trafficking worldwide’ (2008) 3 Victims and Offenders 245, hereafter referred to as ‘Sigmon’, at 246; 
Anna M Gallagher ‘Triply exploited: female victims of trafficking networks – strategies for pursuing 
protection and legal status in countries of destination’ (2004) 19 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 
99, hereafter referred to as ‘Gallagher’, at 101. 
3
 Snyman (n 2) at 282; Sigmon (n 2) at 246. 
4
 Sigmon (n 2) at 249; Gallagher (n 2) at 101. 
5
 Snyman (n 2) at 284. 
6
 Domestic servitude is a very difficult form of trafficking to identify because, inter alia, household 
labour is seldom regulated or inspected by governments – see Sigmon (n 2) at 248. 
7
 Snyman (n 2) at 284; Sigmon (n 2) at 246-7. 
8
 Snyman (n 2) at 284 and 287. 
9
 Ibid at 284.  These organs are then used for traditional healing purposes or medically transplanted into 
other persons. 
10
 Ibid. 
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6 
could serve as a means to illegally adopt children from foreign countries where strict 
administration rules complicate the adoption process.
11
  
The occurrence of human trafficking is rooted in the vulnerability of certain 
persons, who are sought out and exploited for profit.
12
  Factors that contribute to the 
vulnerability of persons include poverty, unemployment, ignorance, illiteracy, 
HIV/Aids, conflict, natural disasters,
13
 discrimination and violence against women.
14
  
The existence of these factors can also aggravate the situations of persons who are 
naturally more vulnerable, such as children or disabled persons.
15
  Other factors, such 
as strict immigration control, globalisation,
16
 cross-border criminal networks and 
deficient legal or political systems, also create an ideal environment for the trafficking 
of human beings.
17
  Furthermore, while modern developments in transport and 
technology make living simpler and more efficient for some humans, these 
developments also facilitate the methods used by traffickers for exploiting people.
18
   
 
2 PROTECTION FOR VICTIMS 
From the description of the different forms of trafficking given above, it is apparent 
that persons could experience a great deal of trauma during the process of being 
trafficked.  Victims of trafficking are obviously susceptible to serious physical harm in 
the form of rape, forced abortions, violent abuse, harassment, starvation or infection 
                                                 
11
 Ibid.  While there is no solid evidence indicating that trafficking occurs for this purpose, Snyman 
suspects that increased levels of foreign adoptions could be indicative of trafficking for adoption.  
12
 Ibid at 282-3. 
13
 The disorder and instability caused by conflict or natural disasters, for example, is often exacerbated in 
developing nations (ibid at 283) – increasing the vulnerability of persons from those societies. 
14
 Ibid at 283 and 285.  Persons affected by these factors will be at a high risk of victimisation, but other 
factors, such as the personality or lifestyle of a person could also make them vulnerable to victimisation 
– see Anna van der Hoven and Alice Maree ‘Victimisation risk factors, repeat victimisation and victim 
profiling’ in Linda Davis and Rika Snyman Victimology in South Africa (Pretoria: Van Schaik 
Publishers, 2005) 55, hereafter referred to as ‘Van der Hoven and Maree’, at 56. 
15
 Snyman (n 2) at 283. 
16
 See Loring Jones at al ‘Globalization and human trafficking’ (2007) 34(2) Journal of Sociology & 
Social Welfare 107, hereafter referred to as ‘Jones et al’. 
17
 Snyman (n 2) at 283.  Some authors also attribute the occurrence of human trafficking to the 
increasing demand for sex industry-related activities and sex tourism; and, as a result, they advocate for a 
decrease in this demand in order to prevent human trafficking – see Sigmon (n 2) at 251. 
18
 Sigmon (n 2) at 246. 
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7 
with sexually transmitted diseases.
19
  However, victims are often also affected 
emotionally or socially by an inability to develop in a natural social environment.
20
  
Victims of human trafficking who are genuinely traumatised by their encounters are 
thus understandably in need of assistance and support - services which, until recently, 
have been lacking due to the absence of policy or legislation dealing with the issue of 
human trafficking.
21
 
Although many early instruments deal with slavery and trafficking as it is 
traditionally understood, none encompass the existing forms of exploitation that are 
involved in human trafficking.
22
  At the international level, contemporary human 
trafficking was first addressed as a distinct issue in the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime
23
 and its Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (hereafter, the 
‘Palermo Protocol’ or ‘Protocol’),
24
 both of which entered into force in 2003.
25
 
The Protocol is a crucial guide to addressing trafficking problems because it 
provides an internationally agreed upon definition of ‘human trafficking’ and also 
creates an obligatory framework for the national enforcement of trafficking laws.
26
  It 
has been argued that the Protocol should also include mandatory provisions regarding 
victim services and protection, where currently states are only required to provide 
assistance if they deem it ‘appropriate’ to do so within their discretion.
27
  The current 
                                                 
19
 Snyman (n 2) at 287; Gallagher (n 2) at 101. 
20
 Snyman (n 2) at 287. 
21
 Ibid at 280. 
22
 Ibid at 281.  For a discussion of the historical development of trafficking legislation and instruments in 
South Africa and internationally, see Snyman (n 2) at 285-6 and Gallagher (n 2) at 101–2. 
23
 United Nations General Assembly United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime A/RES/55/25 (8 January 2001), available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f55b0.html [accessed 28 September 2010]. 
24
 United Nations General Assembly Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime (15 November 2000), available at: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/protocoltraffic.htm [accessed 28 September 2010], hereafter referred 
to as ‘Palermo Protocol’ or ‘Protocol’. 
25
 Sigmon (n 2) at 251. 
26
 Snyman (n 2) at 287.   
27
 Snyman (n 2) at 287; Sigmon (n 2) at 252–3; Gallagher (n 2) at 102; D Singh ‘Piercing the veil on 
trafficking in women’ (2004) 37(3) The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 
1, hereafter referred to as ‘Singh’, at 11–12.  Gallagher (n 2) notes at 102 that the law enforcement 
provisions in the Protocol contain mandatory language, while the victim assistance and protection 
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8 
wording of the Protocol signifies that South Africa, as a state party to the Protocol, 
would only need to provide protective services to victims of human trafficking if it was 
deemed appropriate.
28
  Thus, on its own the Protocol is not sufficiently capable of 
providing trafficking victims with the protection and assistance that they need.  It is 
thus essential that trafficking victims be able to source additional legal protection 
elsewhere, and it is submitted that refugee law has the potential to supply such 
protection. 
However, it should be noted that trafficking victims may also be in need of 
assistance that refugee law cannot provide.  For example, some trafficking victims may 
need reparation from their perpetrators in the form of compensation or an apology.
29
  
Victims may also require witness protection for themselves and their families in order 
to rebuild their lives and feel secure – especially if they are to testify against their 
perpetrators in a criminal trial.
30
  While refugee status will allow victims to access the 
protection afforded to ordinary South African citizens who are victims or witnesses to 
crimes,
31
 it will not guarantee that they qualify for such protection – victims would still 
need to meet the procedural and substantive requirements set out in South African 
law.
32
  Similarly, while refugee status may serve to provide victims of human 
trafficking with additional protection, it cannot necessarily address issues regarding the 
prevention of human trafficking or the prosecution of traffickers.
33
  ‘Protection’ is 
                                                                                                                                              
provisions contain discretionary language.  Sigmon (n 2) states at 253 that the victim protection 
provisions are rarely implemented in countries, and that non-governmental organisations usually take on 
the role of protecting and assisting victims. 
28
 Granting blanket refugee status, in other words, group status determination, to all legitimate victims of 
human trafficking as a protective measure would therefore be within the discretion of the South African 
government.  If the government chooses not to grant additional protection in this manner, as is the case at 
present in South Africa, each trafficking victim would be required to plead their case in an individual 
application for refugee status if they wish to gain legal protective status. 
29
 Snyman (n 2) at 287. 
30
 United Nations General Assembly Report of the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, 
especially women and children A/64/290 (12 August 2009), hereafter referred to as ‘Special Rapporteur 
Report 2009’, at paras 43–6.  See also Snyman (n 2) at 287. 
31
 These protections include the creation of shelters or places of refuge for victims and the development 
of witness protection programmes – David Bruce ‘Challenges of the criminal justice system in 
addressing the needs of victims and witnesses’ in Linda Davis and Rika Snyman (eds) Victimology in 
South Africa (Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers, 2005) 100, hereafter referred to as ‘Bruce’, at 101–2. 
32
 See the Witness Protection Act 112 of 1998. 
33
 Dauvergne (n 1) at 87–8.  With regard to the prevention and prosecution of human trafficking, the state 
will need to take proactive steps.  Thus, the state could take steps to reduce poverty and provide financial 
assistance, as was done in Ghana, so that parents (especially those whose children had already been 
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9 
granted through policies, rights and services aimed at restoring victims’ dignity and 
meeting their needs, while ‘prevention’ of trafficking is achieved by ‘[including] 
policies and practices that cut off modern slavery at the source’ and ‘prosecution’ refers 
to the law enforcement mechanisms used to criminalise and punish trafficking 
conduct.
34
  Providing victims of human trafficking with refugee status will therefore 
not be an absolute solution; other protective, preventative and prosecutorial 
mechanisms may also need to be put in place through the trafficking legislation.  
 
3 HOW COULD REFUGEE STATUS BE RELEVANT? 
The exploitation that underpins the crime of human trafficking has dreadful 
implications for the human rights of individuals.
35
  Besides the obvious affronts to 
dignity and personal freedom, if trafficking is to be regarded as a form of slavery or 
servitude, then its occurrence would directly violate article 4 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights
36
 and article 8 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.
37
  It is for this reason that human trafficking incidents need to be 
addressed not only through criminal justice, but within human rights frameworks as 
well – both nationally and internationally.
38
  This framework could be provided by 
refugee law, which provides protective status to persons who have left their homes in 
fear of persecution and who are at risk of human rights violations.  Trafficking victims 
may be able to meet th  requirements for refugee status, and would then be able to 
access the legal protection available to refugees in South Africa. 
                                                                                                                                              
trafficked) would not be tempted to sell their children into exploitation – see Snyman (n 2) at 287-8 for a 
discussion of the steps taken by the Ghanaian government to prevent and combat trafficking. 
34
 United States Department of State Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000: 
Trafficking in Persons Report 10ed (2010), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2010/index.htm [accessed 15 January 2011], hereafter referred to as 
‘Trafficking in Persons Report 2010’, at 12–15. 
35
 Snyman (n 2) at 280-81; Sigmon (n 2) at 246-7; Dauvergne (n 1) at 73; Jones et al (n 16) at 115. 
36
 United Nations General Assembly Universal Declaration of Human Rights 217 A (III) (10 December 
1948), available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3712c.html [accessed 8 November 2010], 
hereafter referred to as ‘UDHR’.  At art 4 of the UDHR, it is stated that ‘[n]o one shall be held in slavery 
or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms’ (emphasis added). 
37
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 (1966), hereafter referred to as 
‘ICCPR’.  Article 8 of the ICCPR is worded similarly to art 4 of the UDHR. 
38
 Gallagher (n 2) notes at 103 that a human rights perspective to trafficking has been lacking until 
recently. 
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10 
3.1 Accessing protection in South Africa 
3.1.1 South Africa’s anti-trafficking and victim assistance efforts from a global 
perspective 
Since 2001 the United States Secretary of State has submitted an annual report to the 
United States Congress, called the ‘Trafficking in Persons Report’,
39
 that categorises 
countries into three tiers, according to certain minimum standards set by the United 
States of America, depending on their domestic efforts to combat human trafficking.
40
  
The reason for categorising states in this manner is purportedly to ‘[encourage] other 
countries to help fight all forms of modern slavery’
41
 by providing a forum within 
which to compare areas of strength or weakness.  However, the threat of non-trade-
related sanctions,
42
 along with the embarrassment that states are likely to suffer from 
the use of this ‘naming and shaming’ technique, appears to be aimed at punishing states 
with unsatisfactory records, rather than encouraging them. 
In the 2010 report, South Africa was listed as a Tier 2 country, because 
although it does not fully comply with the minimum standards ‘it is making significant 
efforts to do so’.
43
  In order to become compliant, it was recommended that South 
Africa should increase funding for the combating of trafficking, enact and implement 
trafficking legislation, increase awareness, support anti-trafficking NGOs and develop 
procedures for the collection of reliable trafficking statistics.
44
   In order to increase its 
status within the report, and prevent the imposition of sanctions,
45
 South Africa needs 
                                                 
39
 The full title of the annual report is ‘Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000: 
Trafficking in Persons Report’.  For a discussion of the annual report see Dauvergne (n 1) at 75–83. 
40
 Trafficking in Persons Report 2010 (n 34) at 22.  See also Snyman 9n 2) at 286; Sigmon (n 2) at 250-1.  
Tier 1 countries have advanced measures in place to combat human trafficking and meet the minimum 
standards; Tier 2 countries have made significant, albeit inadequate, efforts to combat trafficking; and 
Tier 3 countries are those that have made very little or no effort to address human trafficking.  Tier 2 
countries are further categorised into two groups: those ‘ordinary’ Tier 2 countries, and those on the Tier 
2 Watch List, because, despite efforts to meet the minimum standards, circumstances (such as high 
victim numbers) jeopardise their progress. 
41
 This justification for the existence of the report was given by the U.S Department of State, and can be 
viewed at http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/index.htm [accessed 15 January 2011].  Links to the actual 
reports are also available at this webpage address. 
42
 Sigmon (n 2) at 250. 
43
 Trafficking in Persons Report 2010 (n 34) at 297-9. 
44
 Ibid at 298. 
45
 The Trafficking in Persons Report 2010 (n 34) states at 25 that: 
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11 
to increase the amount of protection it affords to victims of human trafficking – this can 
be achieved by providing victims with a legal status that entitles them to reside within 
the country for an indefinite period. 
 
3.1.2 Who enjoys greater protection in South Africa? Comparing victims of 
trafficking with refugees 
The South African Trafficking Bill
46
 provides less residency protection to victims of 
trafficking than the Refugees Act provides to refugees, but many of the rights and 
privileges held by the two categories of persons overlap. 
 
3.1.2.1 Residence 
Certified victims of trafficking are only permitted to remain in South Africa for a 90-
day ‘recovery and reflection period’,
47
 regardless of whether they are willing to assist 
in the investigation and prosecution of the trafficking perpetrators.
48
  However, this 
period could be shorter where the victim is unwilling to co-operate and it is safe for 
him or her to return to the country of origin.
49
  Temporary residence in the form of a 
visitor’s permit can also be granted, provided that it is unsafe for the victim to return 
                                                                                                                                              
... the U.S. government may withhold nonhumanitarian [sic], non-trade-related foreign 
assistance. Such assistance may be withdrawn from countries receiving it, and in addition, 
countries on Tier 3 may not receive funding for government employees’ participation in 
educational and cultural exchange programs.... governments subject to sanctions would also 
face U.S. opposition to assistance (except for humanitarian, trade-related, and certain 
development-related assistance) from international financial institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. 
46
 Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in Persons Bill [B7–2010], available at: 
http://www.pmg.org.za/bill/20100129-prevention-and-combating-trafficking-persons-bill-b7-2010 
[accessed July 2010].  Hereafter referred to as ‘Trafficking Bill’ or ‘Bill’. 
47
 This fulfils art 7 of the Palermo Protocol, which requires that states consider adopting measures that 
allow trafficking victims to remain within their territory, either temporarily or permanently. 
48
 Clauses 17(1) and 17(5)(a) of the Bill.  This is in line with the Special Rapporteur Rapport 2009 (n 
30), which stipulates at 14 that the provision of assistance must not be conditional on the trafficking 
victim’s co-operation in criminal justice proceedings. 
49
 Clauses 17(2) and 17(3) of the Bill. 
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12 
home or that the victim is in the process of assisting with bringing the perpetrators to 
justice.
50
 
In the case of refugees, the Refugees Act 130 of 1998
51
 provides that refugees 
can remain in South Africa without any time restrictions,
52
 but subject to inter alia the 
provisions concerning the cessation or withdrawal of refugee status.
53
  Refugee status is 
thus a form of immediate ‘temporary residence’ which remains effective indefinitely 
until certain circumstances arise.
54
  Where certified victims of human trafficking have 
to meet additional requirements in order to be allowed temporary residence, certified 
refugees automatically granted temporary residence.
55
 
 
3.1.2.2 Protection from refoulement 
Both refugees and trafficking victims enjoy protection from refoulement (‘expulsion or 
return’)
56
 in South Africa.  Generally, refoulement consists of ‘the forced direct or 
indirect removal of an individual to a country or territory where he runs a risk of being 
subjected to human rights violations’.
57
  The prohibition of refoulement aims to prevent 
violations of human rights and therefore involves a prospective assessment of risk.
58
  In 
South Africa, refoulement is prohibited in terms of s 2 of the Refugees Act.  The 
                                                 
50
 Clause 18 of the Bill.  For a discussion about temporary visas issued to trafficking victims in foreign 
jurisdictions, see Gallagher (n 2) at 118–22. 
51
 Hereafter referred to as the ‘Act’ or ‘Refugees Act’. 
52
 Section 27(b) of the Refugees Act. 
53
 Provisions concerning the cessation and withdrawal of refugee status are found at ss 5 and 36 of the 
Refugees Act respectively. 
54
 Even prior to obtaining refugee status, applicants (called ‘asylum seekers’) are permitted to remain in 
the country without time restrictions, pending a decision about their application for refugee status. 
55
 However, refugees and victims of trafficking have to meet similar requirements for permanent 
residence.  Both require that the person has been resident in South Africa for a continuous period of five 
years.  In the case of refugees, it must additionally be shown that the refugee will remain as such 
‘indefinitely’, while a victim of trafficking must show that ‘he or she may be harmed, killed or trafficked 
again if he or she is returned’.  See s 27(c) of the Refugees Act and clause 19 of the Bill.  For a 
discussion of the political and social benefits of granting permanent residence to trafficking victims, see 
Dauvergne (n 1) at 85–6. 
56
 See title of art 33 in the United Nations General Assembly Convention relating to the status of 
refugees 189 UNTS 137 (28 July 1951), available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3be01b964.html [accessed 3 March 2010].  Hereafter referred to as 
the ‘UN Refugee Convention’. 
57
 CW Wouters International legal standards for the protection from refoulement (Oxford: Intersentia, 
2009), hereafter referred to as ‘Wouters’, at 25.  See also James Hathaway and John Dent Refugee rights: 
report on a comparative survey (York Lanes Press, 1995) at 5–18. 
58
 Wouters (n 57) at 25. 
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13 
provision, which applies to all persons, not only those with refugee or asylum seeker 
status, reads as follows: 
General prohibition of refusal of entry, expulsion, extradition or return to 
other country in certain circumstances 
2.  Notwithstanding any provision of this Act or any other law to the 
contrary, no person may be refused entry into the Republic, expelled, extradited 
or returned to any other country or be subject to any similar measure, if as a 
result of such refusal, expulsion, extradition, return or other measure, such 
person is compelled to return to or remain in a country where— 
(a) he or she may be subjected to persecution on account of his or her race, 
religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular 
social group; or 
(b) his or her life, physical safety or freedom would be threatened on 
account of external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or other 
events seriously disturbing or disrupting public order in either part or the 
whole of that country. 
This is South Africa’s version of art 33 of the UN Refugee Convention, which prohibits 
the refoulement of a refugee where his or her ‘life or freedom would be threatened’ on 
the basis of one of the listed grounds for persecution.
59
  A similar form of the 
prohibition of refoulement has also been included in several clauses of the Trafficking 
Bill.  For example, clause 18(4) provides that a temporary visitor’s permit can be 
granted to a victim of trafficking ‘taking into account the likelihood that the holder of 
that permit may be harmed, killed or trafficked again if he or she is returned’.
60
 
Protection from refoulement is particularly beneficial to trafficking victims 
because it staves off deportation where the victim no longer has a legal basis for 
                                                 
59
 Article 33(1) of the UN Refugee Convention.  However, unlike the South African provision, art 33(2) 
restricts the application of the prohibition where the refugee poses a dangerous risk to the society in 
which he claimed asylum.  For comprehensive accounts of the content and scope of the prohibition of 
refoulement in the UN Refugee Convention, see Wouters (n 57) at Chapter 2.  See also Guy S Goodwin-
Gill and Jane McAdam The refugee in international law 3ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
hereafter referred to as ‘Goodwin-Gill’, at 201–84. 
60
 Similar sentiments are expressed in clauses 19, 25, 30(1)(d) and 30(2)(a)(iii) of the Bill. 
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remaining in South Africa.
61
  According to the Immigration Act 13 of 2002, any ‘illegal 
immigrant’ is subject to removal from the territory of South Africa.
62
  While the 
removal process itself could be traumatic,
63
 deportation may also be undesirable for 
victims of human trafficking because it puts victims in the same vulnerable position 
that exposed them to being trafficked in the first place and puts them at risk of 
prosecution for crimes committed during the trafficking process.
64
  Victims may have 
also migrated to the trafficking destination themselves, without any prompting from 
traffickers, because they were seeking to improve their lives or escape from dangerous 
situations.
65
  Deportation would return these victims to the circumstances that were 
originally detested by them – except now, they would be even more discontent due to 
their trafficking victimisation experience.  A risk of deportation is thus a risk of further 
forms of victimisation. 
 
3.1.2.3 Rights and support services 
As far as rights are concerned, persons with refugee status are expressly entitled to 
enjoy all the rights contained within the South African Bill of Rights,
66
 except those 
that are limited to South African citizens.
67
  Foreign victims of human trafficking who 
are in South Africa will have the same entitlements as refugees in this regard.
68
  
Refugees are furthermore expressly allowed to receive the ‘same basic health services 
and basic primary education which the inhabitants of [South Africa] receive from time 
                                                 
61
 Trafficking victims are commonly fearful of arrest and deportation – Sigmon (n 2) at 254. 
62
 See ss 32, 41 and 49 of the Immigration Act 13 of 2002. 
63
 Deportees are often kept captive in holding facilities near the border or in prisons. 
64
 Snyman (n 2) at 288; Sigmon (n 2) at 254. 
65
 Sigmon (n 2) at 246. 
66
 Section 27(b) of the Refugees Act.  Since South Africa is a party to the UN Refugee Convention, 
refugees in South Africa will also be entitled to all the rights contained therein, although most of them 
overlap with the rights in the South African Bill of Rights.  For a comprehensive discussion of all the 
rights enjoyed by refugees internationally, see James Hathaway The rights of refugees under 
international law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
67
 Dawood and Another v Minster of Home Affairs and Others; Shalabi and Another v Minister of Home 
Affairs and Others; Thomas and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others [1999] JOL 5398 (C) at 
76–7. 
68
 Manifestations of the rights of trafficking victims to safety, adequate health care, sanitation, and 
privacy are also expressly recognised at clause 21of the Bill, where it is stated that minimum norms and 
standards for these rights must be prescribed by the certain members of the Executive. 
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to time’.
69
  Victims of trafficking are also entitled to the basic public health care that is 
available to South Africans,
70
 and they will be able to access education in terms of s 29 
of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996. 
Refugees do enjoy certain additional rights that the Bill does not bestow on 
trafficking victims.  Thus, refugees are entitled to an identity document and travel 
documents in addition to the written recognition of their refugee status – whereas 
trafficking victims are merely issued with a certificate of their victim status.
71
  
Importantly, refugees are also permitted to ‘seek employment’ in South Africa
72
 – 
something that victims of trafficking are only able to do once they have obtained a 
visitor’s permit in terms of clause 18 of the Bill.
73
 
On the other hand, the Bill establishes mechanisms for the accreditation of 
organisations that will provide certified trafficking victims with accommodation, 
counselling and assistance with reintegration into society.
74
  This type of machinery 
does not exist in the Refugees Act.  However, refugee status may prove useful for 
accessing other, perhaps more established and effective, South African organisations 
that care for abused women or victims of sexual violence, amongst others.
75
  Many of 
these organisations require proof of South African citizenship or legal residency before 
they will administer treatment.
76
  Being in possession of refugee status is thus likely to 
increase the possibility of accessing such additional treatment.  In this way, refugee 
status could contribute to the healing of trafficking victims and help them to proceed 
forth with their lives. 
Due to their status as victims of crime, trafficking victims are also entitled to 
compensation in certain instances – refugee status does not grant a right to 
                                                 
69
 Section 27(g) of the Refugees Act. 
70
 Clause 15 of the Bill. 
71
 See s 27 of the Refugees Act at paragraphs (a), (d) and (e), and also ss 30 and 31. 
72
 Section 27(f) of the Refugees Act. 
73
 See subsections (4) and (5). 
74
 Clauses 20–23 of the Bill.  These services are deemed essential for the effective protection and 
recovery of a trafficking victim – Special Rapporteur Report 2009 (n 30) at paras 52–6. 
75
 Snyman (n 2) at 288.  In other words, refugee status will provide access to organisations beyond those 
that are dedicated to assisting only victims of human trafficking. 
76
 Ibid. 
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16 
compensation.
77
  However, qualification for refugee status will also not affect victims’ 
ability to access this right, and should therefore not dissuade victims from applying for 
refugee status. 
 
3.2 Why would a victim of trafficking want or need to apply for refugee 
status? 
The Bill provides mechanisms at clause 30 for voluntary repatriation where victims of 
trafficking wish to return to their countries of origin.
78
  However, victims could also 
wish to remain in South Africa.
79
  This could be the case, for example, where victims 
feel that South Africa could provide protection that is unavailable in their countries of 
origin, where the standard of living is higher in South Africa, or where victims are 
fearful of harm upon return.
80
  Obviously though, desiring to remain does not 
necessarily mean that they will be permitted to do so – all the relevant requirements 
will still have to be met.
81
 
There are various bases upon which a foreign individual could remain in South 
Africa – qualification as a refugee is just one such basis.
82
  However, gaining refugee 
status will be the most valuable option for victims of human trafficking wishing to stay 
in South Africa particularly because of the residency benefits that flow from it.
83
  This 
will enable a trafficking victim who wishes to remain in South Africa beyond the 
recovery and reflection period, and beyond a visitor’s permit period, to properly 
                                                 
77
 See clauses 9(3) and 27 of the Bill.  Compensation forms an important aspect of the victim’s right to 
an effective remedy for the harm suffered by him or her – see Special Rapporteur Report 2009 (n 30) at 
para 63. 
78
 Snyman (n 2) at 288.  The Trafficking in Persons Report 2010 (n 34) indicates at 299 that in South 
Africa ‘almost all foreign victims preferred to return home without pressing charges’.  Where victims 
choose to repatriate, procedures should be put in place to ensure the proper reintegration of the victim 
into his or her community – see clause 31 of the Bill and para 66 of the Special Rapporteur Report 2009 
(n 30). 
79
 Article 14 of the Palermo Protocol stipulates that the rights of trafficking victims to apply for refugee 
status are not affected by any provisions in the Protocol – see also United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees Guidelines on international protection: The application of article 1A(2) of the 1951 
Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the status of refugees to victims of trafficking and persons 
at risk of being trafficked HCR/GIP/06/07 (7 April 2006), hereafter ‘UNHCR Guidelines’, at para 12. 
80
 Gallagher (n 2) at 100. 
81
 Thus, the UDHR includes a right to apply, not qualify, for ‘asylum from persecution’ at art 14. 
82
 See Immigration Act 13 of 2002. 
83
 Dauvergne (n 1) at 88. 
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integrate into South African society, since refugees are not confined to camps or 
settlements in the way that victims of trafficking will be confined to the accredited 
organisations established by the Bill. 
While it is true that the Bill provides victims with most of the protection granted 
to refugees, it is short-term and often subject to qualification or the discretion of an 
administrator or police official.
84
  In contrast, refugee status provides the benefits 
automatically without further requirements.  It is perhaps also noteworthy that the 
trafficking legislation establishes new protective mechanisms that still need to be 
implemented by the South African government.  Those victims with refugee status will 
be able to access protection as though they were South African.  Thus, they would be 
using existing machinery that officials are more familiar with and that, although not 
necessarily effective and efficient, has already been enhanced and developed over time. 
This thesis seeks to ascertain whether persons who have been trafficked could 
qualify for refugee status within the South African legal framework and receive these 
benefits.
85
  In order to qualify, trafficking victims would need to meet all the 
definitional requirements for refugee status in South Africa.  However, before it can be 
assessed whether these requirements are met, it is necessary to identify clearly the 
group of persons that will be the subject of the definitional analysis, namely, victims of 
human trafficking.  These victims can be identified and characterised in terms of the 
offence that was committed against them.  Once the legal parameters of the human 
trafficking offence are defined, the victims of human trafficking will be those persons 
who have suffered the conduct that falls within those parameters.  It is for this reason 
that the legal definition of the offence of human trafficking will be discussed in the 
following chapter. 
 
 
                                                 
84
 Trafficking in Persons Report 2010 (n 34) at 299; Gallagher (n 2) at 103.  However, it is stipulated in 
the Special Rapporteur Rapport 2009 (n 30) at para 50 that the provision of assistance must not be 
conditional on the trafficking victim’s co-operation in criminal justice proceedings.  Conditional access 
to assistance is similarly prohibited in terms of clause 17(5)(a) of the Trafficking Bill. 
85
 Persons who have never been trafficked before could also seek asylum in a foreign country due to a 
fear of being trafficked, but this thesis will only deal with persons who have already been trafficked 
(UNHCR Guidelines (n 79) at 13) – in other words, those that have already been victims of the offence. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The definition of human trafficking 
 
1 THE INTERNATIONAL LAW DEFINITION OF ‘HUMAN 
TRAFFICKING’ 
Although human trafficking is ‘a difficult concept to capture in a single definition’,
86
 
the Palermo Protocol defines ‘trafficking in persons’ as follows at article 3(a): 
(a) "Trafficking in persons" shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, 
harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other 
forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or 
of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or 
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, 
for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the 
exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, 
forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the 
removal of organs[.] 
Aimed at guiding national trafficking legislation, this is the first internationally agreed 
upon conception of human trafficking,
87
 and is quite inclusive in its wording of the type 
of conduct that is to be considered as human trafficking.
88
  Thus, exploitation taking 
place in unusual settings, for example, on farms, in factories or at home, could also fall 
within the ambit of the human trafficking definition.
89
 
                                                 
86
 Snyman (n 2) at 281. 
87
 Sigmon (n 2) at 251. 
88
 Chandré Gould ‘Cheap lives – Countering human trafficking: considerations and constraints’ (June 
2006) 16 SA Crime Quarterly 19, hereafter ‘Gould’, notes at 20 that the definition is purposefully broad 
so that states are provided with ‘legal ammunition’ to develop trafficking legislation capable of 
prosecuting all forms of trafficking conduct. 
89
 Sigmon (n 2) at 252. 
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Three components or elements of trafficking in persons can be discerned from 
the definition: ‘the acts’, ‘the means used’ and ‘the purpose of the acts’.
90
  All three of 
these components need to be present for human trafficking to have taken place.  The 
first component, namely the acts, could be committed by recruiting, transporting, 
transferring, harbouring or receiving a person.  Any ‘threat or use of force or other 
forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, [or] of deception’ against a person that 
accompanies the acts would constitute the second component of the definition – the 
means used.  Similarly, any ‘abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability’ or ‘giving 
or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control 
over another person’ (like parents have control over children) would fulfil the second 
component of human trafficking.  The final component of human trafficking, the 
purpose of the acts, is the exploitation of a person.  The Protocol stipulates that 
‘exploitation’ at the very least must be either ‘the exploitation of the prostitution of 
others’, ‘other forms of sexual exploitation’, ‘forced labour or services’, ‘slavery or 
practices similar to slavery’, ‘servitude’ or ‘the removal of organs’.  Each component 
of the definition will be discussed in more detail in the following section. 
 
1.1 The acts 
This first element of human trafficking is described in the definition as ‘the 
recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons’.
91
  Some of the 
acts that are listed in the definition, namely, ‘transportation’ and ‘transfer’, suggest that 
the person being trafficked needs to be moved from one place to another in order for it 
to constitute human trafficking.
92
  However, such movement is, strictly speaking, not 
necessary, as traffickers can recruit, harbour or receive persons, and then exploit them, 
                                                 
90
 Sigmon (n 2) at 251-2; Gallagher (n 2) at 102; UNHCR Guidelines (n 79) at para 9.  A similar 
classification is made by T Leggett ‘Hidden agendas? The risks of human trafficking legislation’ 
(September 2004) 9 SA Crime Quarterly 1 at 1-6, as discussed in Snyman (n 2) at 281-2. 
91
 Article 3(a) of the Palermo Protocol. 
92
 Snyman (n 2) at 281.  The notion of ‘trafficking’ as motion is attributable to the early 16
th
 century 
origin of the verb ‘to traffic’, which denoted the ‘commercial transportation of merchandise or 
passengers’ – see C Soanes and A Stevenson (eds) Oxford dictionary of English 2ed (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), hereafter referred to as ‘Soanes and Stevenson’, at 1870. 
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all at the same location.
93
  The situation could also arise where victims themselves 
travel to the site of exploitation before any human trafficking process has actually 
begun.
94
  It is then only upon arrival at their destination that the victim is recruited (or 
held captive) and exploited.   
In those instances where trafficking victims are transported from place to place 
by their traffickers, most travel occurs by road, instead of by air or water.  Traffickers 
also tend to use ordinary public modes of transportation, like trains or buses, in order to 
detract attention from the offence they are committing.
95
 
 
1.2 The means used 
This second element of human trafficking is: 
… by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of 
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of 
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the 
consent of a person having control over another person[.]
96
 
The means used to commit the acts listed in the first element and achieve the end goal 
of exploitation can therefore either be direct, in the form of physical intimidation or 
capture, or indirect, in the form of enticement or manipulation.
97
 
The use of ‘abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability’ indicates ‘any 
situation in which the person involved has no real and acceptable alternative but to 
submit’.
98
  This component of human trafficking is thus characterised by a significant 
                                                 
93
 Snyman (n 2) at 281.  The modern linguistic meaning of the verb ‘to traffic’ similarly lacks any 
reference to motion and is described merely as the ‘deal or trade in something illegal’ – Soanes and 
Stevenson (n 92) at 1870. 
94
 This could occur where, for example, the traffickers place bogus advertisements directing potential 
victims to meet them at a certain place in order to receive some benefit promised in the advertisement – 
usually employment (Trafficking in Persons Report 2010 (n 34) at 297).  The trafficking victims could 
also be forced to migrate (to a location where they are later recruited and exploited) due to natural 
disaster or conflict (see Sigmon (n 2) at 246), in which case the traffickers would not at all be responsible 
for the initial movement which brought the victims to the location of exploitation. 
95
 Snyman (n 2) at 285. 
96
 Article 3(a) of the Palermo Protocol. 
97
 Snyman (n 2) at 281-2. 
98
 Gallagher (n 2) at 103. 
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disparity in the power relationship between the victim of human trafficking and his or 
her trafficker.
99
  In other words, the definition assumes that the trafficking victim is 
powerless in relation to the trafficker, and therefore seems to undermine the autonomy 
and agency of the victim.
100
  It could also be argued to the contrary that it is not the 
Protocol which undermines the autonomy of the victim, but rather that the trafficking 
incident itself undermines the victim’s autonomy and that the Protocol’s provisions are 
merely activated by such an undermining of autonomy.   
While it is true that the agency of victims is often denied by the type of harm 
that trafficking exposes them to, the Protocol should have taken care to acknowledge 
the resilience of victims and also their potential to be imperfect.  Power structures that 
operate in relation to gender, culture and socio-economic class,
101
 for example, may 
very well be relevant in these situations, but the ability of the victim to act against 
powerful forces should not be ignored.
102
  Sometimes, the trafficking situation even 
involves the consent of the trafficked person, and many choices are made by the 
trafficked person to lead them to the final point of exploitation.  This is the case where, 
for example, the trafficking victim responds to an advertisement for work opportunities 
in a foreign country (or accepts help from an ‘agent’), which is later revealed to be the 
means used by traffickers to recruit victims.
103
   
These two arguments seem to mirror a debate that was prominent amongst 
women’s rights proponents during the drafting and negotiation stages of the 
Protocol.
104
  With regard to exploitation in the form of prostitution, some women’s 
rights proponents were of the view that prostitution is always exploitative – whether a 
                                                 
99
 Snyman (n 2) at 282. 
100
 See Dauvergne (n 1), who strongly states at 74 that ‘[t]he discourse of victimization erases the 
possibility of women’s agency …. The subject position of victim robs women of voice’. 
101
 In other words, structures such as patriarchy and capitalism. 
102
 See Sandra Walklate ‘Appreciating the victim: conventional, realist or critical victimology?’ in R 
Matthews and J Young (eds) Issues in realist criminology (London: Sage Publications, 1992) 102, 
hereafter referred to as ‘Walklate’, at 113–14.  This is the theoretical approach of ‘critical victimology’, 
which analyses the relationship between agency and structure in victimisation contexts – see generally 
RI Mawby and S Walklate Critical victimology: international perspectives (London: Sage Publications, 
1994); ‘Victimology: theoretical approaches’ in Basia Spalek Crime victims: theory, policy and practice 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) 33, at 44–5; and ‘Theories of victimology’ in L Wolhunter et al 
Victimology: victimisation and victims’ rights (New York: 2009, Routledge-Cavendish) 13, at 26–8. 
103
 Snyman (n 2) at 284-5.  Another example is where a victim of trafficking consents to assistance with 
illegal transit into a country where he or she wishes to reside but cannot immigrate to. 
104
 Dauvergne (n 1) at 73. 
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woman consented to being a prostitute or not.
105
  Proponents of this view argue that 
prostitution and trafficking cannot be separated conceptually because prostitution can 
never be regarded as a legitimate form of labour undertaken freely by women.
106
  Thus, 
prostitution will always be preceded by acts of recruitment, deceptive or coercive 
means and exploitative purposes, where the prostitution itself was the purpose.  In 
contrast, other women’s rights proponents argue that women are legitimately capable of 
choosing to become ‘sex workers’.
107
  In other words, sex workers are autonomous, and 
their decision to exercise such autonomy should not deter governments from providing 
them with protection from exploitation.
108
  In this view, prostitution does not 
necessarily amount to exploitation and trafficking. 
The Protocol definition clearly adopts the former approach to women’s rights 
and thus perpetuates the stereotype of the weak, blameless and virtuous victim in 
opposition to a powerful and evil offender
109
 – an approach which may affect the way 
in which Refugee Status Determination Officers (hereafter referred to as ‘RSDOs’) 
view certified victims of trafficking.  Where RSDOs adopt the Protocol’s idea that 
trafficking victims are vulnerable and helpless individuals, they are more likely to be 
sympathetic when exercising their discretion whether to grant refugee status to victims 
or not.  On the other hand, RSDOs who adopt the Protocol’s sentiment may be 
unsympathetic when presented with a certified victim of human trafficking who does 
not fit the stereotype of a weak, helpless ‘victim’.
110
  A victim, even if certified as such, 
could thus be treated as eligible for refugee status depending on how he or she has 
                                                 
105
 Gould (n 88) at 21.  The reasoning for this argument is that women’s consent is merely apparent in 
situations such as prostitution – consent is not genuine because it is given as a result of male domination. 
106
 Ibid. 
107
 Ibid. 
108
 Ibid. 
109
 This manner of stereotyping upholds what has been identified in the field of victimology as ‘the false 
dichotomy between offenders and victims’ – Ezzat Fattah ‘The evolution of a young, promising 
discipline: sixty years of victimology, a retrospective and prospective look’ in Shoham et al International 
handbook of victimology (London: CRC Press, 2010) 43, hereafter referred to as ‘Fattah’, at 57–8. 
110
 The RSDO may then, improperly, deem the applicant as ‘undeserving’ of refugee status – see United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Handbook on procedures and criteria for determining refugee 
status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the status of refugees (January 
1992), available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3314.html [accessed March 2010], 
hereafter referred to as ‘UNHCR Handbook’, at para 202.  The principles contained in this Handbook 
have been adopted and applied by South African courts inter alia in Fang v Refugee Appeal Board and 
Others [2006] JOL 18635 (T), at 19–20. 
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reacted to the victimisation and whether he or she comes across as a stereotypical 
‘victim’ or not.  The meaning assigned to the concept of human trafficking, and its 
underlying connotations, is therefore important not only in determining who qualifies 
as a victim of trafficking, but also in moulding attitudes towards trafficking victims – 
including the attitudes of the administrators responsible for granting refugee status. 
  
1.3 The purpose of the acts 
The third and final element of human trafficking is: 
… for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the 
exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, 
forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the 
removal of organs[.]
111
 
In order for the acts to constitute human trafficking, the purpose of committing the acts 
must be the exploitation of the person trafficked.  Thus, a trafficking victim need not 
have actually been exploited for human trafficking to have taken place – it is merely 
required that the acts and means used, as described in the definition, have occurred, but 
for the purpose of exploitation.  In this way the Protocol distinguishes between 
trafficking conduct and exploitative conduct that is the motivation for the trafficking 
conduct.
112
 
The Protocol attempts to clarify what will constitute ‘exploitation’ in order to 
satisfy the third element of the ‘trafficking in persons’ definition.  However, the 
drafting of this portion of the definition can lead to much confusion, due to the 
simultaneous use of the word ‘include’ and the phrase ‘at a minimum’. 
On one hand, the words ‘[e]xploitation shall include, at a minimum...’ could be 
interpreted as meaning that at its most basic level ‘exploitation’ includes the listed 
practices, but that it is not limited to these practices, and further, that none of the listed 
practices have to be present in order for there to be ‘exploitation’.  On the other hand, 
                                                 
111
 Article 3(a) of the Palermo Protocol. 
112
 Snyman (n 2) at 282. 
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the words could be interpreted to mean that at the very least one of the listed forms of 
exploitation has to be present in order for there to be ‘exploitation’.  Any exploitative 
conduct in addition to the listed forms could then also constitute ‘exploitation’, just as 
long as one listed form was present. 
It is submitted that the former interpretation could result in the scope of 
‘exploitation’ being almost limitless, because no lower or upper constraints have been 
placed on the meaning of the concept – a few examples of practices that do constitute 
exploitation have merely been given.  One could look to the ordinary linguistic 
meaning of  ‘exploitation’,
113
 but the lack of minimum or maximum thresholds would 
only be aggravated by the subjective nature of the term – what is exploitation in the 
eyes of one may not be exploitation in the eyes of another, depending on cultural 
practices, religious views and personal inclinations.
114
  Where the meaning of 
‘exploitation’ is so broad that almost any harmful practices could qualify as human 
trafficking (provided that the other two elements for human trafficking have been met), 
then the Protocol provisions defining and prohibiting ‘trafficking in persons’ would be 
rendered ineffective.  This is because genuine trafficking cases would be completely 
indistinguishable from other instances where persons are recruited for harmful 
purposes.
115
  General principles of legal interpretation presume that no futile provisions 
are included within written laws.
116
  Thus, in order to prevent an overly inclusive or 
vague definition of ‘trafficking in persons’, ensure that the number of human 
trafficking complaints correlates with the seriousness of the offence, and preclude the 
futility of the Protocol’s provisions, an interpretation that limits the scope of 
‘exploitation’ should be favoured.  For these reasons, it is submitted that the latter 
interpretation of ‘exploitation’ should be adopted. 
                                                 
113
 C Botha Statutory interpretation: An introduction for students 4ed (Lansdowne: Juta & Co, Ltd, 
2005), hereafter referred to as ‘Botha’, at 86-7. 
114
 Snyman (n 2) at 282.  Snyman notes at 282 that ‘certain practices, such as arranged marriages or 
organ donation’, which are conventional in some cultures or religions, could be deemed exploitative by 
persons who do not engage in those practices.  However, Snyman seems to suggest that the test for 
exploitation should be based on principles of ‘the integrity and equality of a person’ instead of whether 
the practices are culturally accepted or not.  This would be in compliance with the Constitution of South 
Africa, 1996, which protects the values of equality and human dignity at ss 9 and 10 respectively. 
115
 It is difficult to recognise genuine victims of human trafficking (as will be discussed in Chapter 6), 
even with a limited interpretation of the concept of ‘exploitation’. 
116
 Botha (n 113) at 73-4. 
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Thus, the Protocol is deemed to list the minimum requirements for forms of 
‘exploitation’ that are sufficient to meet the definition of human trafficking.
117
  In order 
to constitute ‘exploitation’ in terms of the Protocol, at least one of the listed forms of 
harm (‘the exploitation of the prostitution of others’, ‘other forms of sexual 
exploitation’, ‘forced labour or services’, ‘slavery or practices similar to slavery’, 
‘servitude’ or ‘the removal of organs’) must therefore be discernible in the abusive 
practices.  Any harmful practices that are not listed can only amount to ‘exploitation’ 
where it is present in addition to one of the listed forms.
118
 
It should be noted that although it is suspected that children are transported for 
the purpose of being adopted in foreign countries,
119
 adoption in itself does not 
constitute ‘exploitation’ in terms of the Protocol.  In other words, the fraudulent or 
forced transit of children purely for the purpose of their adoption in another place does 
not amount to ‘human trafficking’.  One of the definition’s listed forms of exploitation 
would need to be present in addition to the adoption in order to constitute ‘exploitation’ 
in respect of ‘human trafficking’. 
 
1.4 Additional principles applicable to the trafficking of persons in the 
Protocol  
Article 3(b) of the Protocol stipulates that a trafficking victim’s consent to future 
exploitation is irrelevant if any of the means listed in the second element of the 
trafficking definition are used by the traffickers.  In other words, where the second 
element is met, consent will not negate, or affect in any manner, the presence of the 
trafficking offence.  This principle applies specifically to adult victims of human 
trafficking, who consent to their exploitation.
120
 
                                                 
117
 Snyman (n 2) at 282. 
118
 It is submitted that the additional conduct would need to be harmful or abusive in some way in order 
to be considered exploitative.  Furthermore, that the linguistic meaning of ‘exploitation’, as well as the 
listed forms of exploitation, could, although not conclusive, provide guidance as to what might be 
considered exploitative conduct in terms of the definition. 
119
 Snyman (n 2) at 284. 
120
 Sigmon (n 2) at 252. 
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This principle seems to recognise that even where adult have consented to being 
exploited during or at the end of the trafficking process, if some form of manipulation 
or force was used by the traffickers during the trafficking process, such consent could 
never have been informed consent given freely by the victim.  It is therefore not real 
consent, and cannot be legally recognised as a defence to the offence committed by the 
traffickers.
121
  While this principle may be appropriate in some cases, it may also be 
inappropriate in others – the presence of forms of coercion or deception does not 
necessarily result in consent, especially where the person desires beforehand to engage 
in conduct that is considered exploitative by the Protocol.  Thus, the Protocol again 
seems to undermine the autonomy of victims by denying that they have the ability to 
make their own choices, specifically where those choices may be considered bad. 
Furthermore, where a child, defined as ‘any person under eighteen years of 
age’,
122
 is the trafficking victim concerned, article 3(c) specifies that: 
(c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for 
the purpose of exploitation shall be considered ‘‘trafficking in persons’’ even if 
this does not involve any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this 
article [.] 
Thus, where the relevant victim is a child, the second element of the offence, namely, 
the means used, is not a requirement or necessary element for the offence of human 
trafficking to have occurred.
123
  A child is therefore a victim of ‘trafficking in persons’ 
simply provided that one of the listed acts was committed against him or her for the 
purpose of exploitation.
124
 
This principle seems to be based on the rationale that children, due to their 
vulnerability and dependency, can be the victims of human trafficking without 
                                                 
121
 Where the second element of human trafficking is not present, consent to exploitation on the part of 
the victim could be a defence to the offence as it would, arguably, be free and informed consent; 
however, it would be unnecessary to raise any defence in that case because the definitional requirements 
for the offence would not have been met in the first place. 
122
 Article 3(d) of the Palermo Protocol. 
123
 Sigmon (n 2) at 252. 
124
 Note that despite this principle, committing one of the listed acts (in the absence of coercion or 
deception) for the sole purpose of adopting a child can still not constitute ‘trafficking’ because ‘adoption’ 
does not amount to ‘exploitation’ in terms of the Protocol. 
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traffickers needing to force or manipulate them into being recruited for the purpose of 
exploitation. 
Although this latter principle is important to note because of the different 
requirements that apply to child victims of human trafficking, this thesis will focus 
primarily on adult victims of human trafficking.  Thus, the Protocol definition of 
‘trafficking in persons’ will henceforth be dealt with as though all three elements are 
required for human trafficking to have occurred. 
 
2 THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL DEFINITION OF ‘TRAFFICKING’ 
As a party to the Palermo Protocol, South Africa has committed itself to the Protocol’s 
provisions – including art 5, which dictates that measures dealing with and 
criminalising all forms of human trafficking must be implemented.
125
  However, any 
principles of an international agreement can only become binding law in South Africa 
by the inclusion of those principles in national legislation.
126
 Thus, the discussion of the 
possibility of trafficking legislation for South Africa has been ongoing since December 
2003
127
 – before then, no specific framework for the restriction of human trafficking 
existed in the country.
128
  There was much debate about whether new laws were 
actually necessary, as some argued that legislation existing before the Bill could be 
used separately to prosecute the different acts that are involved in human trafficking.
129
  
Others argued that specific trafficking legislation was necessary because the concepts 
                                                 
125
 Article 5 of the Palermo Protocol.  See also Snyman (n 2) at 285; Sigmon (n 2) at 251.  Note that at a 
regional level, the African Union Ouagadougou action plan to combat trafficking in human beings, 
especially women and children (November 2006), available at: www.africa-union.org [accessed 30 
August 2010], would be relevant to South Africa. 
126
 Section 231(4) of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996. 
127
 Nolwandle Qaba ‘Trafficking in persons: a South African response’ (2004) 1(5) Sexual Offences 
Bulletin 42, hereafter ‘Qaba’, at 43–5.  For a comprehensive record of the legislative process, that is, the 
meetings, hearings and discussions held by various bodies concerning the drafting of trafficking 
legislation, see www.pmg.org.za/search/apachesolr_search/trafficking%20persons [accessed August 
2010]. 
128
 Snyman (n 2) at 285. 
129
 Ibid at 285-6.  Thus, it was argued by Bronwyn Pithey ‘Do new crimes need new laws? Legal 
provisions available for prosecuting human trafficking’ (September 2004) 9 SA Crime Quarterly 7, at 7-
10 that legislation such as the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998, the Child Care Act 74 of 
1983 and the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bill B2 of 2003 (now the Criminal Law 
(Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007) could be used to prosecute or 
control human trafficking, especially that which involves sexual exploitation, in South Africa. 
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used in existing legislation were not always compatible with the contemporary 
trafficking process.
130
  In light of this latter argument, Parliament has proceeded with 
the drafting of a trafficking bill that aims to give effect to the Protocol.  At present, the 
Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in Persons Bill [B7–2010] is before 
Parliament for comment and approval.
131
 
Formulating a definition for the concept of human trafficking is an immensely 
difficult task to overcome during the drafting of trafficking legislation.
132
  It is however 
vital that the task be performed well because a poorly drafted definition of the offence 
could result in confusion about the criminal elements that need to be proven by 
prosecutors.
133
  The Bill includes a comprehensive definition for ‘trafficking’, which 
significantly adds to the basic components of the Protocol definition of ‘trafficking in 
persons’.  Until the Bill or similar trafficking legislation comes into effect, the offence 
of trafficking will be dealt with in terms of transitional provisions contained in the 
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007.
134
  
This Act also contains a definition for ‘trafficking’ at s 70(2)(b) that is similar to the 
Bill’s definition, although not as extensive.
135
  However, this definition will not be 
                                                 
130
 Snyman (n 2) at 286; Qaba (n 127) at 42. 
131
 As at 21 January 2011, the Bill was before the Committees of the National Assembly – see 
www.pmg.org.za/billsstatus/ [accessed 28 January 2011]. 
132
 Snyman (n 2) at 285-6. 
133
 Ibid at 286. 
134
 See ss 70 and 71 of Act 32 of 2007. 
135
 The definition at s 70(2)(b) of Act 32 of 2007 is as follows: 
'trafficking' includes the supply, recruitment, procurement, capture, removal, transportation, 
transfer, harbouring, sale, disposal or receiving of a person, within or across the borders of the 
Republic, by means of— 
            (i) a threat of harm; 
            (ii) the threat or use of force, intimidation or other forms of coercion; 
            (iii) abduction; 
           (iv) fraud; 
           (v) deception or false pretences; 
(vi) the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability, to the extent that the complainant 
is inhibited from indicating his or her unwillingness or resistance to being trafficked, 
or unwillingness to participate in such an act; or 
            (vii)  the giving or receiving of payments, compensation, rewards, benefits or any other 
advantage, 
for the purpose of any form or manner of exploitation, grooming or abuse of a sexual nature of 
such person, including the commission of any sexual offence or any offence of a sexual nature 
in any other law against such person or performing any sexual act with such person, whether 
committed in or outside the borders of the Republic, and 'trafficks' and 'trafficked' have a 
corresponding meaning. 
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discussed in any more detail in this thesis.
136
  This is due to the transitional nature of 
the provisions and their primary concern with trafficking for sexual purposes.
137
  
Therefore, the definition of ‘trafficking’ as contained in the Bill, and not in the 
transitional provisions, will now be analysed. 
 
2.1 The definition of ‘trafficking’ in the Bill 
Clause 1 of the Bill contains the following definition for ‘trafficking’:
138
 
‘trafficking’ includes the delivery, recruitment, procurement, capture, removal, 
transportation, transfer, harbouring, sale, exchange, lease, disposal or receiving 
of a person, or the adoption of a child facilitated or secured through legal or 
illegal means, within or across the borders of the Republic, of a person 
trafficked or an immediate family member of the person trafficked, by means 
of— 
(a)  a threat of harm; 
(b)   the threat or use of force, intimidation or other forms of coercion; 
(c)  the abuse of vulnerability; 
(d)  fraud; 
(e)   deception or false pretences; 
(f)  debt bondage; 
                                                 
136
 For a more comprehensive discussion of these provisions see Dee Smythe ‘Sections 70–71: 
Transitional provisions relating to trafficking in persons for sexual purposes’ in Dee Smythe et al (eds) 
Commentary on the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 
(Cape Town: Juta, in press 2011), Chapter 31. 
137
 Section 71 of Act 32 of 2007 creates the offence of ‘trafficking in persons for sexual purposes’ at 
subsection (1), while ‘involvement in trafficking in persons for sexual purposes’ is criminalised at 
subsection (2). 
138
 Although the definition term is not as specific as that in the Protocol, namely, ‘trafficking in persons’ 
[emphasis added], it is clear from the wording of the definition that, for the purposes of the Bill, 
‘trafficking’ applies to human trafficking, and not to the trafficking of drugs or weaponry, for example.  
The Bill definition also does not specify that root or derivative words such as ‘traffic’, ‘trafficks’, 
‘trafficker’ or ‘trafficked’, as used in other provisions of the Bill, have meanings corresponding to that 
assigned to ‘trafficking’ in the Bill – although one can assume that must be the case.  Such an application 
of corresponding meanings has explicitly been included in other definitions for ‘trafficking’ in, for 
example: s 70(2)(b) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 
2007; and clause 1 of the 2009 draft Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in Persons Bill [B – 
2009], available at http://www.pmg.org.za/bill/20090508-prevention-and-combating-trafficking-persons-
bill [accessed July 2010].  This draft Bill even included a definition for ‘victim of trafficking’, namely 
‘any person who is a victim of the offence of trafficking in persons’. 
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(g)  abduction; 
(h)  kidnapping; 
(i)  the abuse of power; 
(j)  the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to obtain the consent of 
a person having control or authority over another person; or 
(k) the giving or receiving of payments, compensation, rewards, benefits or 
any other   advantage, 
for the purpose of any form or manner of exploitation, sexual grooming or 
abuse of such person, including the commission of any sexual offence or any 
offence of a sexual nature in any other law against such person or performing 
any sexual act with such person, whether committed in or outside the borders of 
the Republic[.] 
The same three elements for human trafficking can be discerned from this definition as 
those which are discernible from the Protocol definition of ‘trafficking in persons’.  
Thus, the definition is also divided into the acts, the means used, and the purpose of the 
acts that together constitute trafficking.  The content of each element, as contained 
within the Bill, will be discussed in turn. 
 
2.1.1 The acts 
The acts that constitute the first element of human trafficking are described as follows: 
… includes the delivery, recruitment, procurement, capture, removal, 
transportation, transfer, harbouring, sale, exchange, lease, disposal or receiving 
of a person, or the adoption of a child facilitated or secured through legal or 
illegal means, within or across the borders of the Republic, of a person 
trafficked or an immediate family member of the person trafficked[.]
139
 
Similarly to the Protocol, this portion of the definition of ‘trafficking’ acknowledges 
that movement of the victim can take place, but that it is not inherent in the trafficking 
process.  It is also clear that trafficking does not necessarily have a transnational 
                                                 
139
 Clause 1 of the Bill at ‘trafficking’. 
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component to it.
140
  This is evident by the use of the words ‘within or across the borders 
of the Republic’.
141
  Apart from this similarity though, the content of this element in the 
Bill is vastly different to that contained in the Protocol.  The most noticeable difference 
is that while the Protocol only lists five acts, the Bill lists 14 acts (including all five that 
are listed in the Protocol) that could satisfy the first element of the ‘trafficking’ 
definition.  This widens the types of conduct that are thought to initiate the trafficking 
process considerably. 
Furthermore, unlike the Protocol, the Bill expressly recognises that in human 
trafficking processes, human beings are often treated as commercial objects, in terms of 
which illegal contracts of sale, exchange or lease are undertaken by traffickers.  The 
Bill definition also addresses the suspected role played by adoption in human 
trafficking.  Although this was discussed above in the context of children being 
trafficked for the purpose of adopting them, the Bill treats adoption as an act which is 
committed for the purpose of exploiting, sexually grooming or abusing children.
142
  In 
other words, while contemplating the trafficking definition in the Protocol, it was 
contemplated that children are trafficked so that they can be adopted.  However, in 
terms of the Bill, children are adopted so that they can be exploited.  Thus, adoption 
can be viewed from two different causal perspectives.
143
 
Finally, the Bill specifies that the listed trafficking acts can be committed 
against the person who is actually being trafficked, or against an immediate family 
member of the person who was trafficked.  Besides the circular nature of this portion of 
the definition (the term ‘trafficked’ is used in an explanation of the term ‘trafficking’), 
it was unnecessary to include the words ‘or an immediate family member of the person 
                                                 
140
 Qaba (n 127) at 42; UNHCR Guidelines (n 79) at para 10.  An example of trafficking conduct that 
takes place within South Africa is the traditional practice of ukuthwala – a form of forced marriage 
where women and girls are kidnapped by prospective husbands (see Trafficking in Persons Report 2010 
(n 34) at 297). 
141
 Note that while technically any victims of trafficking who come to South Africa could apply for 
refugee status, this thesis will concentrate on those victims who have been trafficked to, from or within 
South Africa – not on those victims who have been trafficked elsewhere, and then subsequently come to 
South Africa to seek asylum. 
142
 At clause 1 the Bill defines ‘child’ as ‘a person under the age of 18 years’. 
143
 While the Bill has followed the Protocol by not adopting the perspective that adoption can be 
included as part of the purpose of the acts element of human trafficking, the Bill has departed from the 
Protocol in adopting the perspective that adoption, whether effected by legal or illegal means, can 
constitute one of the acts of human trafficking. 
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trafficked’ in the definition because, where those acts, together with the requisite means 
and purpose, were committed against him or her, the family member would him- or 
herself be ‘the person trafficked’ spoken of in the definition.  Alternatively, where the 
listed acts have been committed against a family member of a victim, unaccompanied 
by the requisite means and purpose, not all of the definition’s elements would have 
been met.  If the legislature was implying that immediate family members could also be 
complainants in a criminal case involving their trafficked relative, as might be the case, 
then it should have indicated this in more precise terms. 
It is important to note that the Bill makes use of the term ‘includes’ before 
listing the acts, which could mean that the list of acts given by the legislature is not a 
closed list and that other non-listed acts that fall within the ordinary meaning of 
‘trafficking’ could also meet the first element of the definition.  If this is the correct 
interpretation of the word ‘includes’, then the definition’s scope could become even 
broader, which would make it increasingly difficult to ascertain whether conduct 
constitutes trafficking or not. 
The word ‘includes’, as used in legislation to introduce a list of items, has been 
interpreted by South African courts.  Recently, an interpretation was undertaken by the 
Constitutional Court in the case of De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions, 
Witwatersrand Local Division and Others,
144
 in regard to the definition of ’child 
pornography’ in the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment 
Act 32 of 2007.  Following precedent in R v Ah Tong
145
 and R v Debele,
146
 the court 
enumerated three possible interpretations for the word ’includes’: 
The correct sense of ‘includes’ in a statute must be ascertained from the context 
in which it is used. Debele provides useful guidelines for this determination. If 
the primary meaning of the term is well known and not in need of definition and 
the items in the list introduced by ‘includes’ go beyond that primary meaning, the 
purpose of that list is then usually taken to be to add to the primary meaning so 
that ‘includes’ is non-exhaustive. If, as in this case, the primary meaning already 
                                                 
144
 2003 (2) SACR 445 (CC); 2003 (12) BCLR 1333 (CC).  Hereafter referred to as ‘De Reuck’. 
145
 1919 AD 186 at 189–90. 
146
 1956 (4) SA 570 (A). 
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encompasses all the items in the list, then the purpose of the list is to make the 
definition more precise. In such a case “includes” is used exhaustively. Between 
these two situations there is a third, where the drafters have for convenience 
grouped together several things in the definition of one term, whose primary 
meaning – if it is a word in ordinary, non-legal usage – fits some of them better 
than others. Such a list may also be intended as exhaustive, if only to avoid what 
was referred to in Debele (supra) as ‘’n moeras van onsekerheid’ (a quagmire of 
uncertainty) in the application of the term.
147
 
The use of ‘includes’ in describing the ‘acts’ element of trafficking, seems to fall into 
the third situation enumerated by De Reuck as some of the listed items fit the ordinary 
meaning of the act of trafficking better than others.  Linguistically, the verb ‘to traffic’ 
usually refers to the action of dealing or trading (in something that is illegal).
148
  
However, only some of the listed acts, such as ‘transfer’, ‘sale’, ‘exchange’ and ‘lease’, 
match this ordinary meaning properly.  Thus, although the term ‘includes’ is used, the 
list must be deemed to be exhaustive.  In order to avoid unnecessary uncertainty, only 
the listed items can constitute ‘acts’ in satisfaction of the first element of ‘trafficking’. 
In De Reuck, the Court expressed the opinion that the legislature could have 
decreased the potential for confusion and uncertainty by using the word ‘means’ 
instead of ‘includes’.
149
  It is submitted that the same adjustment could be made in the 
Bill to ensure that the list of acts is regarded as a closed list and that the definition of 
trafficking is more limited in its scope.  As mentioned above, the number of items 
listed within this element alone is already considerable.  Leaving the element open to 
even more interpretation could cause the definition to be uncertain, incapable of 
interpretation, and, as a result, unenforceable. 
 
 
 
                                                 
147
 De Reuck (n 144) at para 18.  Original footnotes omitted. 
148
 Soanes and Stevenson (n 92) at 1870. 
149
 De Reuck (note 144) at para 19. 
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2.1.2 The means used 
The definition lists 11 means by which traffickers would have had to commit the acts 
discussed above in order for the second element of ‘trafficking’ to have been met: 
… by means of— 
(a)  a threat of harm; 
(b)   the threat or use of force, intimidation or other forms of coercion; 
(c)  the abuse of vulnerability; 
(d)  fraud; 
(e)   deception or false pretences; 
(f)  debt bondage; 
(g)  abduction; 
(h)  kidnapping; 
(i)  the abuse of power; 
(j)  the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to obtain the consent of 
a person having control or authority over another person; or 
(k) the giving or receiving of payments, compensation, rewards, benefits or 
any other   advantage,
150
 
This is a closed list of possible means.  Thus, unlike the first element, this second 
element is more explicitly limited in its potential interpretative scope.  However, the 
inclusion of ‘or’ indicates that any one of the listed means can be present in order to 
fulfil this part of the definition, and each listed item has some scope for further 
interpretation.  The legislature has therefore precluded the possibility of incorrect 
interpretation by law enforcement and the courts by including additional definitions for 
two of the listed items: ‘abuse of vulnerability’ and ‘debt bondage’.   
The first of these listed means, ‘abuse of vulnerability’,
151
 acknowledges that 
often the root of human trafficking is the vulnerability of potential victims,
152
 which 
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 Clause 1 of the Bill at ‘trafficking’. 
151
 Defined at clause 1 of the Bill as: 
‘abuse of vulnerability’, for purposes of the definition of trafficking, means any physical or 
psychological abuse that leads a person to believe that he or she has no reasonable alternative 
but to submit to exploitation, and includes, but is not limited to, taking advantage of the 
vulnerabilities of that person resulting from— 
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makes them susceptible to deceit and coercion.  The definition recognises the inherent 
vulnerability of illegal migrants, pregnant women, disabled persons, addicts, children 
and the poor,
153
 and the ability of traffickers to take advantage of their vulnerabilities.  
Abuse of vulnerability is also contained within the Protocol definition of ‘trafficking in 
persons’ as a listed means. 
The second listed means that is defined by the Bill, ‘debt bondage’,
154
 is not 
explicitly included in the Protocol definition, although it could be interpreted as falling 
within some of the other listed Protocol means (such as ‘other forms of coercion’, 
‘deception’ or ‘fraud’).  By expressly including debt bondage, or, the pledging of 
services in order to ‘pay off’ a loan (either real or contrived), as a means used in 
committing the acts of human trafficking, the Bill seems to be highlighting the 
prevalence of this method in trafficking processes.  In this respect, the Bill goes so far 
as to criminalise the intentional causing of a person’s entrance into ‘debt bondage’ as a 
separate offence at clause 5. 
Other means listed by the Bill that are not listed by the Protocol are: ‘a threat of 
harm’,
155
 ‘intimidation’,
156
 ‘false pretences’,
157
 ‘kidnapping’,
158
 and ‘the giving or 
                                                                                                                                              
(a) the person having entered or remained in the Republic illegally or without proper 
documentation; 
(b)  pregnancy; 
(c)  any disability of the person; 
(d) addiction to the use of any dependence-producing substance; 
(e)  being a child; and 
(f)  socio-economic circumstances; 
152
 Snyman (n 2) at 282–3. 
153
 Although, it is specified in the definition of ‘abuse of vulnerability’ that the reasons for vulnerability 
are not limited to those listed in the clause and mentioned here. 
154
 Defined at clause 1 of the Bill as: 
‘debt bondage’ means the status or condition that arises from a pledge by a person of— 
(a) his or her personal services; or 
(b) the personal services of another person under his or her control, 
as security for a debt owed, or claimed to be owed, including any debt incurred or claimed to be 
incurred after the pledge is given, by that person if the— 
(i) debt owed or claimed to be owed, as reasonably assessed, is manifestly excessive; 
(ii) length and nature of those services are not respectively limited and defined; or 
(iii) value of those services as reasonably assessed is not applied towards the liquidation of 
the debt or purported debt; 
155
 Clause 1 of the Bill at ‘trafficking’, para (a). 
156
 Ibid, para (b). 
157
 Ibid, para (e). 
158
 Ibid, para (h). 
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receiving of payments, compensation, rewards, benefits or any other advantage’.
159
  
The inclusion of the last of these listed means recognises that benefits are not only 
promised to parents so that they will consent to the trafficking of their children – 
benefits are also promised to adults so that they will agree to their own trafficking and 
exploitation. 
 
2.1.3 The purpose of the acts 
As per the other two elements of human trafficking, the Bill adds considerably to the 
third element of the definition.  The third element is stated thus: 
… for the purpose of any form or manner of exploitation, sexual grooming or 
abuse of such person, including the commission of any sexual offence or any 
offence of a sexual nature in any other law against such person or performing 
any sexual act with such person, whether committed in or outside the borders of 
the Republic;
160
 
While the Protocol names only one purpose that will meet the requirement for human 
trafficking, ‘exploitation’, the Bill mentions three possible purposes, namely 
‘exploitation, sexual grooming or abuse of such person’.  Like the Protocol, the Bill 
includes an explicit definition for ‘exploitation’ – although no separate definition is 
offered for ‘sexual grooming’ or ‘abuse’.  Exploitation is thus defined at clause 1 of the 
Bill as follows: 
‘‘exploitation’’ includes, but is not limited to— 
(a)  all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery; 
(b) forced marriage; 
(c)  sexual exploitation; 
(d)  servitude; 
(e)  debt bondage; 
(f) forced labour; 
(g) child labour as defined in section 1 of the Children’s Act; 
                                                 
159
 Ibid, para (k). 
160
 Clause 1 of the Bill at ‘trafficking’. 
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(h)  the removal of body parts; and 
(i) the impregnation of a female person against her will for the purpose of 
selling 
her child when the child is born[.] 
It can be seen from the outset that the Bill includes a few forms of exploitation that are 
not included in the Protocol, namely: 'forced marriage’, ‘debt bondage’, ‘child labour 
as defined in section 1 of the Children’s Act’, and ‘the impregnation of a female person 
against her will for the purpose of selling her child when the child is born’. 
Furthermore, the definition stipulates that exploitation ‘includes, but is not 
limited to’ the listed forms of exploitation, whereas the Protocol requires that ‘at a 
minimum’ exploitation ‘includes’ one of the listed forms.  As discussed earlier, the 
words ‘includes at a minimum’ in the Protocol definition allow for two possible 
interpretations, but, in order to limit the already extensive scope of the human 
trafficking offence, they should be interpreted to mean that at least one of the listed 
forms has to be intended for the third element to have been met.  The Bill’s wording 
however stipulates that while the listed forms will constitute ‘exploitation’, other types 
of harm could, without requiring the additional presence of a listed form, also qualify 
as ‘exploitation’.  Thus, due to the use of the words ‘but is not limited to’ in the Bill, it 
is clear that the term ‘includes’ introduces a non-exhaustive list of exploitation forms, 
and that these forms may go beyond the ordinary meaning of the term ‘exploitation’.
161
  
To avert the danger associated with a limitless list of potential exploitation forms, it is 
submitted that any additional forms should only be considered as ‘exploitation’ where 
they fall within the ordinary meaning of exploitation or where they are similar in kind 
to the items listed in the definition.
162
 
Some of the listed forms of exploitation are defined further in the Bill, and can 
be subjected to additional interpretation.
163
  Presumably, those listed forms of 
exploitation without definitions are to be interpreted in accordance with their ordinary 
                                                 
161
 This is a converse application of the reasoning in De Reuck (n 144) at para 18. 
162
 De Reuck (n 144) at para 19. 
163
 For example, ‘forced marriage’ is defined at clause 1 of the Bill as ‘a marriage concluded against the 
will and without the valid consent of both parties to the marriage’.  See also definitions for ‘debt 
bondage’, ‘forced labour’, ‘removal of body parts’, ‘servitude’, ‘sexual exploitation’ and ‘slavery’ at 
clause 1. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
 
38 
meanings.  The scope of ‘exploitation’, and the type of intended conduct which will 
qualify as exploitation, is thus broadened significantly in the Bill. 
Furthermore, although the Protocol did include ‘the removal of organs’ as a 
form of exploitation,
164
 the Bill has slightly altered the wording of this form to ‘the 
removal of body parts’.
165
  This is important because where ‘organs’ refer only to those 
parts of the human body that are ‘self-contained and [have] a specific vital function’,
166
 
‘body parts’ could refer to any portions of the human body, whether they are classified 
as organs or not.  The Bill’s broader meaning of this form of exploitation is made 
apparent from its definition: 
‘‘removal of body parts’’ means the removal of or trade in any organ or other 
body part from a living person who has been trafficked or the body of a 
deceased person who has been trafficked and killed for the sole purpose of 
removing the organ or other body part in contravention of the National Health 
Act, 2003 (Act No. 61 of 2003);
167
 
Thus, traffickers can intend to remove the victim’s body parts while the victim is still 
alive or when the victim is already deceased – both would qualify as purposes that 
satisfy the third element of the definition. 
Finally, ‘debt bondage’
168
 is oddly included both as a form of exploitation, in 
other words as a purpose for which trafficking acts are committed, and as a means used 
to commit trafficking acts.  It is fathomable that debt bondage could be used as a device 
to recruit and capture a victim for trafficking.  It is also fathomable that someone could 
be trafficked with the intention that they would become party to a debt bondage 
situation.  However, it seems illogical that debt bondage can be a means used and a 
purpose simultaneously.  In other words, how can traffickers use debt bondage as a 
means to recruit or transport someone for the purposes of debt bondage?  As will be 
discussed in the next Chapter, the Protocol definition tries to separate actual 
exploitation from the intention to exploit, and only includes the latter of these in the 
                                                 
164
 Article 3(a) of the Protocol. 
165
 Clause 1 of the Bill at ‘exploitation’, para (h). 
166
 Soanes and Stevenson (n 92) at 1240. 
167
 Clause 1 of the Bill.  Emphasis added. 
168
 Defined at clause 1 of the Bill and discussed above at 2.1.2. 
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definition of ‘trafficking in persons’.
169
  By including debt bondage as both a means 
used and a purpose in the ‘trafficking’ definition, the Bill recognises that victims are 
often exploited during the trafficking process as well.
170
 
As far as the purposes of ‘sexual grooming’ and ‘abuse’ is concerned, no 
explicit definitions are included in the Bill.  Presumably, ‘sexual grooming’ refers to 
the offences enumerated in ss 18 and 24 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and 
Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007.  However, this is a confusing association 
to make because the offences at ss 18 and 24, respectively concern complainants who 
are children and those who are mentally disabled persons, whereas the Bill makes no 
such limitations on the potential victim.  It is therefore unclear what the Bill means by 
‘sexual grooming’.  Furthermore, s 18 contains two offences, namely ‘promoting the 
sexual grooming of a child’ and the actual ‘sexual grooming of a child’, and s 24 
contains similar offences.  Thus, it is difficult to discern whether the third element of 
‘trafficking’ only refers to the purpose of actual sexual grooming or whether a purpose 
to promote the sexual grooming of the trafficking victim will also suffice. 
The ‘trafficking’ definition describes ‘abuse’ as: 
… including the commission of any sexual offence or any offence of a sexual 
nature in any other law against such person or performing any sexual act with 
such person, whether committed in or outside the borders of the Republic;
171
 
The inclusion of this description of ‘abuse’ was unnecessary because much of the 
conduct described already forms a part of another purpose – exploitation.  This is 
owing to the fact that ‘exploitation’ encompasses the concept of ‘sexual 
exploitation’,
172
 which is defined at clause 1 of the Bill as follows: 
                                                 
169
 Snyman (n 2) at 282. 
170
 Ibid at 282 and 284.  It is however unclear whether it was the legislature’s intention to do so or 
whether poor drafting happened to be advantageous in this instance. 
171
 Clause 1 of the Bill.  Although the third element of the trafficking definition could be interpreted to 
mean that all three purposes together could include within their meaning ‘the commission of any sexual 
offence … borders of the Republic’, it is more likely that only the last-mentioned purpose, namely 
‘abuse’, includes those types of conduct, since ‘exploitation’ is given its own specific definition in the 
Bill. 
172
 See clause 1 of the Bill at ‘exploitation’, para (c). 
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‘‘sexual exploitation’’ means the commission of any sexual offence in terms of 
the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act or 
any offence of a sexual nature in any other law against a victim of trafficking, 
and includes forcing a victim of trafficking to participate in the production of 
pornographic material or to perform any act of a sexual nature in, but not 
limited to, a strip club, massage parlour, brothel or escort agency; 
The only conduct that is included in the ‘abuse’ description but not in the definition of 
‘sexual exploitation’ is the ‘[performance] of any sexual act with such a person’.
173
  
Furthermore, unlike ‘sexual exploitation’, the ‘abuse’ description indicates that it does 
not matter whether the abusive acts are intended to (or do) take place in South Africa or 
elsewhere.  Since the Bill lacks a distinctive description for ‘abuse’ and the term is 
often used as a blanket term for most kinds of sustained harm, the scope of the 
definition for ‘trafficking’ is expanded considerably by the inclusion of the ‘abuse’ as a 
purpose.  This is demonstrative of bad drafting and a failure to consider the 
implications of including such an ambiguous concept within the definition of 
‘trafficking’. 
 
2.2 Concerns about the Bill’s definition of ‘trafficking’ 
As mentioned above, the Protocol’s definition is greatly inclusive with regard to the 
type of conduct that will fall within the ambit of ‘trafficking in persons’.  However, the 
definition of ‘trafficking’ in the Bill goes even further to broaden significantly the 
scope of what will be considered as human trafficking.  Therefore, the conduct that is 
prohibited in terms of Chapter 3 of the Bill will be much more extensive.  Chapter 3 
creates offences for ‘trafficking in persons’,
174
 ‘involvement of trafficking in 
                                                 
173
 Clause 1 of the Bill at ‘trafficking’.  In terms of the description there is no requirement that the sexual 
acts be performed without consent.  The inclusion of this as a form of intended ‘abuse’ could be 
problematic because, for example, a man could be convicted of ‘trafficking’ where he convinces a 
woman to travel home with him (commits an act of transportation) so that he can perform consensual 
sexual acts with her like kissing or intercourse (with the purpose of abuse), by untruthfully declaring his 
love for her (by means of deceit).  The serious criminalisation of this sort of behaviour is wholly 
undesirable. 
174
 Clause 4(1) of the Bill. 
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persons’,
175
 ‘[p]ossession, destruction, confiscation, concealment of or tampering with 
documents’ to ‘[facilitate] or [promote] trafficking in persons’,
176
 ‘[u]sing services of 
victims of trafficking’,
177
 ‘conduct facilitating trafficking in persons’
178
 and ‘[l]iability 
of carriers’ who transport ‘victim[s] of trafficking’.
179
  A broader definition for 
‘trafficking’ is therefore relevant in the application and enforcement of all these 
offences, thereby increasing the (already wide-ranging) scope of criminalisation in the 
Bill significantly. 
While the South African legislature is obviously trying to account for the 
varying forms and modes of human trafficking, there is a danger of over-
criminalisation and legislative uncertainty to the point where law enforcement officials 
classify almost any behaviour as human trafficking, or where officials cannot 
distinguish trafficking conduct from other types of criminal conduct.  Uncertainty in 
the definition of ‘trafficking’ could also render the Bill’s provisions unenforceable.
180
  
Due to the presumption that legislation does not contain futile provisions,
181
 uncertainty 
in the definition should be avoided by limiting the interpretation and scope of 
‘trafficking’ in the Bill. 
The Bill’s definition is made convoluted by the inclusion of further definitions 
for ‘the abuse of vulnerability’, ‘debt bondage’ and ‘exploitation’, the latter of which 
contains yet more terms that are defined by the Bill.  For legal scholars and 
prosecutors, mastering the definition of ‘trafficking’ as currently contained in the Bill 
will therefore be fairly challenging.  One can only imagine then how law enforcement 
officials, or Refugee Status Determination Officers wishing to ascertain whether 
someone qualifies as a victim of ‘trafficking’, will grapple with identifying trafficking 
                                                 
175
 Ibid at clause 4(2). 
176
 Ibid at clause 6. 
177
 Ibid at clause 7. 
178
 Ibid at clause 8(1).  Furthermore, clause 8(2) and (3) of the Bill constitute an offence for ‘[c]onduct 
facilitating trafficking in persons’ that is committed specifically by internet service providers. 
179
 Ibid at clause 9. 
180
 Gould (n 88) at 22.  See also Gould at 19: 
… it is vital for law enforcement agencies to have a clear understanding of what practices 
constitute trafficking, in order to successfully identify, investigate and prosecute such cases.  
Without a clear definition and understanding of what needs to be prevented and controlled, an 
effective response is impossible. 
181
 Botha (n 113) at 73. 
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conduct.  Trafficking identification will not only require ample training and expertise – 
a great amount of time and resources will also be required.  The definition, while 
comprehensive in the type of conduct that it tries to cover, is thus impracticable for 
South Africa’s criminal justice system. 
An important result of this overly broad and convoluted definition is that the 
concept ‘victim of human trafficking’ becomes significantly more fluid and imprecise.  
In terms of the Bill, once an incident of human trafficking is reported, an assessment 
must be conducted on the persons concerned to assess whether they are victims of 
trafficking.
182
  If the assessment is affirmative, a certificate will be issued to certify that 
the person is indeed a ‘victim of trafficking’.
183
  Therefore, the Bill has the effect of 
formalising and concretising a concept that is vague and open to much interpretation by 
the assessors concerned.  Only persons in possession of the certificate can then be 
considered genuine trafficking victims – for all legal purposes, including refugee status 
determination.  This could have adverse consequences for legitimate trafficking victims 
who wish to qualify for refugee status in South Africa, but who have not been certified. 
In the spite of all these concerns, there is hope for South Africa’s trafficking 
legislation.  While the Bill is at the final stages of the legislative process, it has not yet 
achieved the status of an Act and can therefore still be modified and improved.
184
  The 
Bill is admirable for taking a victim-centred and human rights approach to the issue of 
human trafficking.  However, in order to provide effective assistance to victims, the 
Bill needs to be revised – particularly in regard to the definition of ‘trafficking’. 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
The nature of the offence and its effect on victims 
                                                 
182
 Clause 13(5)(b) of the Bill. 
183
 Ibid at clause 13(7)(a). 
184
 Once it is an Act, however, any alterations to the wording of provisions will have to be made via a 
formal amendment - see Botha (n 113) at 37–8.  The national legislative process is enumerated at ss 73–
82 of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996. 
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1 PROTRACTED NATURE OF THE OFFENCE 
It can be concluded from both the international and South African definitions discussed 
above that the offence of human trafficking is a process consisting of a number of 
different acts committed sequentially over a period of time.
185
  Three geographical 
phases could be discernible from the trafficking process: the recruitment phase, transit 
phase and exploitation phase.
186
  Where the phases take place across national borders, 
the state of recruitment is called the ‘country of origin’, an intermediate state used for 
transit is called the ‘country of transit’, and the state in which the exploitation occurs is 
called the ‘country of destination’.
187
  Therefore, human trafficking does not occur as a 
single event but as a continuous process ending in exploitation. 
The conduct that collectively constitutes the crime is often difficult to recognise 
or distinguish, and this impedes the work of both res archers and prosecutors.
188
  
Additional criminal activities, such as kidnapping, assault, money laundering, forgery, 
corruption and prostitution, frequently accompany the trafficking process.
189
  For 
example, travel and identification documents are often forged, falsified or obtained 
from corrupt administrators to ease the transit of the trafficking victim; while the 
trafficking victim’s real documents are confiscated and kept by the traffickers.
190
  The 
presence of these other activities makes prosecution more complex and further 
obscures the detection of human trafficking. 
As stated previously, the Protocol attempts to distinguish the acts involved in 
trafficking, which are undertaken for the purposes of exploitation, from the actual 
                                                 
185
 Snyman (n 2) at 281; UNHCR Guidelines (n 79) at para 10. 
186
 Snyman (n 2) at 281.  As discussed in Chapter 3, human trafficking as defined in the Protocol does 
not necessarily involve the geographical movement of a victim, but where such movement does take 
place, these three geographical phases are recognisable. 
187
 Snyman (n 2) at 281.  Similar labels are assigned to ‘areas’ where trafficking takes place within one 
state or within a local district.  Similar labels are also used in refugee law to describe the countries 
moved through during flight, except that the final destination is called the ‘country of asylum’ instead of 
the ‘country of destination’.  It is sad to note that in the context of human trafficking South Africa is 
simultaneously a country of origin, transit and destination – see Snyman (n 2) at 286-7; Trafficking in 
Persons Report 2010 (n 34) at 297; Qaba (n 127) at 42. 
188
 Snyman (n 2) at 281, Pithey (n 129) at 7-10. 
189
 Sigmon (n 2) at 249. 
190
 Snyman (n 2) at 284; Sigmon (n 2) at 249. 
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exploitation.
191
  In other words, a person need not have actually been exploited in order 
to have been ‘trafficked’ in terms of the Protocol – that the trafficking occurred for the 
purpose of exploitation is sufficient.  These concepts are however not always easy to 
differentiate because exploitation can also occur at the recruitment stage or while the 
trafficked person is in transit.
192
  Furthermore, where victims are manipulated or 
coerced during the trafficking process, those acts can in themselves be exploitative in 
that they undermine the dignity and human rights of the trafficking victims.
193
  Thus, 
although those acts do not constitute ‘exploitation’ in terms of the Protocol, they form 
part of a protracted period of abuse and mistreatment which makes up the trafficking 
process. 
 
2 THE PERPETRATORS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
Due to the protracted nature of the offence, a number of persons are usually involved in 
a single human trafficking process.
194
  Perpetrators often operate within sophisticated 
criminal networks that traverse vast global regions and profit considerably from the 
exploitation of trafficking victims.
195
  These networks develop advanced methods for 
changing their modes of operation, varying their transit routes and concealing their 
identities in order to remain undetected and evade capture.
196
  However, the 
perpetrators of human trafficking could also be smaller informal groups or individuals 
who attempt to benefit from trafficking activity on a smaller scale.
197
  The trafficking 
victim may even know someone involved in the process – relatives, community 
                                                 
191
 Snyman (n 2) at 282. 
192
 Ibid.  Thus, Snyman (n 2) states at 282 and 284 that trafficked persons are sometimes overpowered or 
raped into submission by their traffickers during a so-called ‘seasoning process’. 
193
 Ibid at 282. 
194
 Ibid at 283-4.  The persons involved in the process will act in different capacities and have different 
roles depending on the phase of the trafficking process and the circumstances of each trafficking incident 
– see Snyman (n 2) at 284. 
195
 Snyman (n 2) at 283; Sigmon (n 2) at 249.  In additional to human trafficking, these large organised 
networks often partake in other transnational criminal activity, such as the trafficking of drugs or 
weaponry – Sigmon at 249. 
196
 Sigmon at 249. 
197
 Ibid. 
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members or persons with authority over the victim sometimes facilitate initial contact 
between the traffickers and the victim.
198
 
 
3 NATURE OF THE VICTIMISATION 
The effects of trafficking victimisation could be physical, psychological, social or 
financial.
199
  Physical effects could be as a result of assault, abuse or torture endured by 
the victim during the trafficking process, and can include aches, bruising, loss of 
appetite, exhaustion and insomnia.
200
  In respect of psychological effects, some 
trafficking victims will suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), but most will 
have lesser emotional reactions in the form of shock, panic, nightmares, angry 
outbursts, exaggerated fear, disorientation, or being easily startled.
201
  Long-term 
psychological effects include depression, paranoia, withdrawal and some victims may 
commit acts of self-harm.
202
  Some victims could develop addictions because of 
coerced substance abuse during the trafficking process.
203
  These psychological effects 
could seriously impact on the victim’s ability to interact in society and may put strain 
on the victim’s relationships.  This could be particularly relevant where traffickers 
threaten the victim’s family members or friends.
204
  The victim’s employment situation 
and prospects may also be adversely affected, particularly since the victim will have 
been away from work for a period of time.  For the victim to overcome these effects, 
                                                 
198
 Snyman (n 2) at 283; Trafficking in Persons Report 2010 (n 34) at 297.  This is the case where, for 
example, desperate parents consent to the trafficking of their child because the traffickers promise a 
better life for the child in the country of destination – Snyman (n 2) at 283–4. 
199
 Zuzelle Pretorius and Barbara Louw ‘Victim empowerment and support in South Africa’ in Linda 
Davis and Rika Snyman Victimology in South Africa (Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers, 2005) 74, 
hereafter referred to as ‘Pretorius and Louw’, at 75. 
200
 Diana Tudorache ‘General Considerations on the Psychological Aspects of the Trafficking 
Phenomenon’ in Guglielmo Schinina (ed) Psychosocial support to groups of victims of human trafficking 
in transit situations Vol 4 (International Organisation for Migration, February 2004) 19, at 22.  Hereafter 
referred to as ‘Tudorache’. 
201
 Tudorache (n 200) at 21–3; Pretorius and Louw (n 199) at 75; Sigmon (n 2) at 253–4.  See also AA 
Jones ‘Post-traumatic stress disorder and victims of human sex trafficking: a perpetuation of chronic 
indignity’ (2009) 4 Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 317, particularly at 327–8. 
202
 Pretorius and Louw (n 199) at 75; Tudorache (n 200) at 23–4. 
203
 Trafficking in Persons Report 2010 (n 34) at 297. 
204
 Sigmon (n 2) at 254. 
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intervention in the form of victim support, health care and counselling is required.
205
  
Where these are not provided to the victim by the state, the victim may also incur great 
expenses in order to recover from the ordeal. 
Furthermore, a number of fundamental rights that are protected in the South 
African Constitution
206
 could be adversely affected by the process of trafficking, as 
defined in the Protocol and Bill.  Where a trafficking victim endures physical abuse by 
traffickers or exploiters the rights to life and freedom and security of the person, 
including the right to bodily integrity,
207
 would be implicated.  Where a trafficking 
victim is held captive, he or she is denied the right to freedom of movement and 
protection from arbitrary arrest.
208
  Where women are trafficked because men perceive 
them as objects to take advantage of, the right to protection from gender discrimination 
and other women’s rights would be affected.
209
  Where conditions are unfavourable, the 
rights to privacy, fair labour practices and a clean and safe environment could be 
relevant.
210
  Where trafficking victims are separated from their families for long 
periods of time, or where children are trafficked, rights concerning the family unit and 
a number of children’s rights could be violated.
211
  Finally, and arguably most 
importantly, throughout the process the right to human dignity of the victim will be 
undermined.  These are serious human rights violations and can therefore have long-
lasting effects in the lives of trafficking victims. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the successful trafficking of human persons is 
rooted in the vulnerability of potential victims.  This is highlighted in the title of the 
Protocol, as it recognises that two of society’s most vulnerable groups, women and 
                                                 
205
 Victims may also require translation services and legal assistance in the country of destination – 
Special Rapporteur Report 2009 (n 30) at paras 59–62. 
206
 Most of these rights are also protected in terms of the UDHR (n 36), the ICCPR (n 37) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 993 UNTS 3 (16 December 1966), 
hereafter the ‘ICESCR’. 
207
 See ss 11 and 12 of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996, respectively. 
208
 Sections 21 and 12(1) of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996, respectively. 
209
 Ibid at s 9. 
210
 Ibid at ss 14, 23 and 24 respectively. 
211
 Children’s rights are protected in terms of s 28 of the Constitution, while the right to family unity has 
been recognised as forming part of the right to dignity (s 10 of the Constitution) by the Constitutional 
Court in Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Shalabi and Another v Minister of 
Home Affairs and Others; Thomas and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2000 (8) BCLR 
837 (CC). 
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children, are most often the victims of human trafficking.
212
  A genuine experience of 
human trafficking victimisation could magnify the vulnerability of each victim, to a 
point where urgent remedial assistance may become necessary.  It should be reiterated 
here that while the Protocol correctly recognises that victims act (or fail to act) within 
the constraints of power structures such as patriarchy, the ability of victims to be 
resilient in the face of their vulnerability should also be acknowledged.
213
  Thus, 
victimisation experiences may also strengthen some victims by demonstrating to them 
that they are capable of surviving their vulnerabilities.  
It is important to note however victims of human trafficking will subjectively 
perceive, define and live their victimisation experiences differently, depending on their 
personal characters and backgrounds.
214
  Thus, the needs of trafficking victims will 
differ from person to person.  As an offence, human trafficking also has different 
effects on victims in comparison to other offences.  However, while trafficking victims 
may experience the specific effects of trafficking victimisation, they will also 
experience the generic effects of being a victim of crime, some of which will overlap 
with the effects of trafficking.
215
  Furthermore, where other offences are also 
committed against the victim during the trafficking process, the victimisation 
experiences will all be compounded.  This labyrinth of victimisation experiences 
requires that policies designed to assist human trafficking victims be comprehensive 
and nuanced enough to address all the possible needs of victims and provide them with 
adequate protective rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
212
 Although this is true, men have also been the victims of human trafficking – Snyman (n 2) at 284. 
213
 Walklate (n 102) at 113–14. 
214
 Fattah (n 109) at 50. 
215
 Sigmon (n 2) at 250. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Definitional requirements for refugee status 
 
1 WHO IS A ‘REFUGEE’ IN SOUTH AFRICA?
216
 
1.1 Section 3 of the Refugees Act – the definition of ‘refugee’ 
The definitional requirements for refugee status in themselves present an immense 
challenge to victims of human trafficking who wish to remain in South Africa.  
According to s 3 of the Refugees Act 130 of 1998 (‘Act’ or ‘Refugees Act’), a person 
qualifies for refugee status in South Africa only if he or she: 
(a) owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted by reason of his or her 
race, tribe, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a 
particular social group, is outside the country of his or her nationality 
and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of 
that country, or, not having a nationality and being outside the country 
of his or her former habitual residence is unable or, owing to such fear, 
unwilling to return to it; or 
(b) owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events 
seriously disturbing or disrupting public order in either a part or the 
whole of his or her country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave 
his or her place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge elsewhere; 
or 
(c) is a dependant of a person contemplated in paragraph (a) or (b). 
From the provision it is clear that refugee status may be obtained in three different 
circumstances.  The first circumstance, contained in paragraph (a), is where a person 
has fled his or her country of origin because of a fear of persecution.  The need for 
protection stems from a person’s fear that he or she may be a specific target for 
                                                 
216
 While this thesis only considers the South African construction of the ‘refugee’ concept, there are 
varying international opinions about who a refugee is.  See, for example AE Shacknove ‘Who is a 
refugee?’ (January 1985) 6 Ethics 274.  Hereafter referred to as ‘Shacknove’. 
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persecution in the country of origin, because of a particular characteristic that he or she 
displays.  The first circumstance is thus highly individualistic and based primarily on 
the sentiment of the refugee concerned and the refugee’s personal experience within the 
context of the country or origin. 
Paragraph (a) of the definition is taken from art 1A(2) of the United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
217
 adopted in 1951, as amended by art I 
of the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.
218
  Taking its cue from the 
Refugee Protocol, the South African provision does not limit the scope of refugee-
producing events to a certain time period, as was done in the UN Refugee 
Convention.
219
  Furthermore, the South African definition adds an item to the list of 
                                                 
217
 See note 56.  Article 1A(2) of the UN Refugee Convention states: 
 A. For the purposes of the present Convention, the term ‘refugee’ shall apply to any person 
who: 
 ... 
(2) As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a 
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such 
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 
218
 United Nations General Assembly Protocol relating to the status of refugees 606 UNTS 267 (31 
January 1967), hereafter referred to as the ‘Refugee Protocol’.  Article 1 of the Refugee Protocol, states: 
 ...  
2. For the purpose of the present Protocol, the term ‘refugee’ shall, except as regards the 
application of paragraph 3 of this article, mean any person within the definition of article I of 
the Convention as if the words ‘As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and...’ 
and the words ‘...as a result of such events’, in article 1 A (2) were omitted.   
3. The present Protocol shall be applied by the States Parties hereto without any geographic 
limitation, save that existing declarations made by States already Parties to the Convention in 
accordance with article IB(I) (a) of the Convention, shall, unless extended under article IB(2) 
thereof, apply also under the present Protocol. 
219
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at paras 35–6 and 108–10.  Before its amendment by the Refugee 
Protocol, the UN Refugee Convention limited persecution, at art 1A(2), to that ‘[a]s a result of events 
occurring before 1 January 1951’ because many countries did not want to assume responsibility for 
future events that they could not foresee.  This was not only a temporal limitation; it was a geographic 
limitation too, because most large refugee-producing events before 1951 occurred in Europe during the 
first and second world wars.  States also had the option of expressly limiting the application of the 
refugee definition to events occurring only in Europe.  Thus, art 1B of the UN Refugee Convention read 
as follows:  
B. (1) For the purposes of this Convention, the words "events occurring before 1 January 1951" 
in article 1, section A, shall be understood to mean either  
(a)  ‘events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951’; or  
(b)  ‘events occurring in Europe or elsewhere before 1 January 1951’; and each 
Contracting State shall make a declaration at the time of signature, ratification or 
accession, specifying which of these meanings it applies for the purpose of its 
obligations under this Convention.   
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grounds for persecution that is not contained within the UN Refugee Convention or its 
Refugee Protocol – tribe.  This seems fitting in a country where most of the population 
find their historical origins within a traditional African tribe. 
Only paragraph (a) will be the focus of this thesis.  Given that it is the 
instrument from which paragraph (a) originates, the UN Refugee Convention and its 
accompanying Refugee Protocol will be used as interpretive tools when applying the 
South African definition to victims of human trafficking.  The Refugees Act itself 
acknowledges the need to consider these two instruments when applying and 
interpreting its provisions at s 6(1)(a) and (b). 
The second circumstance, contained in paragraph (b), pertains to situations of 
war or hostility in the whole or a part of a person’s country of origin, which causes an 
individual to flee.  In this circumstance, the reason for flight is not based on the fear of 
being a particular object of pursuit.  Rather, flight is deemed necessary because of 
unrest and instability in the country of origin, which endangers the survival of the 
general population.  Paragraph (b) of the definition finds its origins in art 1(2) of the 
Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa, 1969.
220
  Recognising the existence of widespread conflict in 
Africa, caused by states themselves and also by rebel forces, the OAU Convention 
made special provision for those persons who are forced to flee their homes due to 
conditions of danger and instability, rather than individualised persecution.
221
  It is 
noteworthy that this paragraph permits qualification for refugee status even where only 
a portion of the country is in a state of conflict, provided that the person concerned 
                                                                                                                                              
(2) Any Contracting State which has adopted alternative (a) may at any time extend its 
obligations by adopting alternative (b) by means of a notification addressed to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations. 
220
 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa 1001 UNTS 45 (10 September 1969), hereafter referred to as the ‘OAU Convention’.  Article 1(2) 
of the OAU Convention reads as follows: 
2.  The term ‘refugee’ shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, 
occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the 
whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual 
residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality. 
221
 Shacknove (n 216) at 275. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
 
51 
would be affected by it and he or she could not reasonably have been expected to seek 
refuge in another portion of the same country.
222
 
The third circumstance, contained in paragraph (c), exists where an individual is 
a dependent of someone who qualifies for refugee status under either paragraph (a) or 
(b).  In this third circumstance, refugee status is granted because of the relationship that 
exists between an individual and a refugee, and is thus a derivative status.  This 
derivative status was included in the definition in fulfilment of Recommendation B of 
the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons.
223
  This resolution, made at the same conference that adopted the UN 
Refugee Convention, recommends that ‘the unity of the refugee's family [be] 
maintained particularly in cases where the head of the family has fulfilled the necessary 
conditions for admission to a particular country’.
224
  Paragraph (c) is thus South 
Africa’s attempt to ensure that the right to family unity is enjoyed by recognised 
refugees. 
A Bill to amend the Refugees Act was introduced in 2010 for consideration by 
the National Assembly.  The Refugees Amendment Bill
225
 does not however propose 
any amendments to s 3 of the Act.  Thus, the requirements for refugee status that are 
currently found in the Act will be dealt with as is in the discussions that follow. 
 
1.2 The application process 
The process for the application and granting of refugee status is enumerated in the 
Refugees Act.  Claimants for refugee status must personally go to a Refugee Reception 
Office
226
 to make an application with a Refugee Reception Officer (RRO).
227
  The 
RRO has a duty to accept the application, assist the claimant with completing the 
                                                 
222
 Although the UN Refugee Convention does not include this principle within its definition of a 
‘refugee’, the principle was recognised in 1992 by the UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 91. 
223
 Final Act of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons, 1951 UNdoc. A/CONF.2/108/Rev.1 (26 Nov. 1952). 
224
 Ibid at B(1). 
225
 B30–2010, available at: http://www.pmg.org.za/bill/20100820-refugees-amendment-bill-b30-2010 
[accessed 27 January 2011].  Hereafter referred to as the ‘Refugees Amendment Bill’. 
226
 Established in terms of s 8 of the Refugees Act. 
227
 Section 21(1) of the Refugees Act. 
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application, and submit the completed application to a Refugee Status Determination 
Officer (RSDO) at the Refugee Reception Office.
228
  It is then the duty of the RSDO to 
determine the outcome of the application.  Pending the RSDO’s decision, the RRO 
must issue an ‘asylum seeker permit’ to the claimant in terms of s 22(1) of the Act.  As 
a recognised asylum seeker, the claimant will, subject to conditions, be allowed to 
remain in South Africa (temporarily, dependant on the outcome of the application) and 
also study and/or work while in the country.
229
  Thus, merely applying for refugee 
status could bestow victims of human trafficking with more rights than they would 
have under the trafficking Bill. 
Finally, in making a decision and considering all relevant information, the 
RSDO ‘must have due regard’ for the claimant’s right to administrative justice 
contained in s 33 of the Constitution,
230
 since status determination is an administrative, 
not judicial, procedure.  The RSDO can then grant refugee status, reject the application 
either as ‘manifestly unfounded, abusive or fraudulent’ or as ‘unfounded’, or refer a 
question of law to a Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs established in s 9 of the 
Act.
231
  Where decisions are unfavourable, claimants have the ability to appeal or 
submit them for review in terms of ss 25 and 26 of the Act. 
Here, it is worth mentioning that the Refugees Amendment Bill replaces the 
Act’s ‘Refugee Status Determination Officer’ with a ‘Status Determination 
Committee’.  A Status Determination Committee is to be ‘established by the Director-
General [of the Department of Home Affairs] in the prescribed manner to consider and 
deal with applications for asylum in accordance with section 24’.
232
  The Bill however 
does not include any reference to the composition of the Committee – it merely 
                                                 
228
 Section 21(2) of the Refugees Act.  Section 21(2)(c) permits the Refugee Reception Officer to 
‘conduct such enquiry as he or she deems necessary in order to verify the information furnished by the 
application’ but the enquiry cannot result in the Officer’s refusal of the application. 
229
 Section 22(1) of the Refugees Act.  In the case of Minister of Home Affairs and Others v Watchenuka 
and Another 2004 (2) BCLR 120 (SCA); [2004] 1 All SA 21(SCA) it was decided that, based on the 
right to dignity of persons present in South Africa, the lack of alternative means of support and the 
lengthy period that applicant’s have to wait for the outcome of their status applications, asylum seekers 
should be permitted to work in South Africa. 
230
 Section 24(2) of the Refugees Act.  The RSDO will also have to bear in mind the provisions of the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
231
 Section 24(3) of the Refugees Act. 
232
 See clause 3(a) of the Refugees Amendment Bill. 
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specifies that the ‘prescribed manner’ for its establishment is to be set out in 
regulations.
233
  It is therefore unclear what a Status Determination Committee will look 
like and how it will affect status determinations in practice.  What is clear is that where 
previously a single administrator determined the fate of a refugee, there will now be a 
committee of administrators.  This could decrease the likelihood of partial 
determinations, increase administrator accountability and allow for a larger and more 
diverse pool of expertise in each status determination. 
 
1.3 Burdens and standards of proof in refugee applications 
In accordance with general principles of evidence, the burden of proof in claims for 
refugee status rests on the refugee applicant.
234
  Therefore, the claimant must furnish 
evidence and establish the truth and accuracy of the facts that underlie his or her 
claim.
235
  However, because refugees often flee without being able to gather relevant 
documents and have limited access to resources in the country of asylum, adjudicators 
responsible for determining the status of refugees are expected to share with refugee 
applicants the burden of ascertaining and evaluating evidence.
236
  This is primarily 
achieved by gathering relevant information about the country of origin in order to 
verify facts alleged by the claimant.
237
 
The standard of proof in refugee status determinations is less robust than the 
standards for criminal proceedings (proof beyond a reasonable doubt) or civil 
proceedings (proof on a balance of probabilities).  Thus, the facts alleged in a refugee 
claim do not need to be proven so that the adjudicator is completely convinced of their 
                                                 
233
 Section 1 of the Refugees Act stipulates that ‘prescribed’ denotes ‘prescribed by regulation’ in the 
Act.  Presumably this would also be the case in the Refugees Amendment Bill, which contains clauses 
that eventually become are to become a part of the Act.  
234
 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Note on Burden and Standard of Proof 
in Refugee Claims (16 December 1998), available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3338.html [accessed April 2010], at para 6.  Hereafter 
referred to as ‘Note on Burden and Standard of Proof’.  See also UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at paras 
195–6. 
235
 Note on Burden and Standard of Proof (n 234) at paras 5–6; Gina Clayton Textbook on immigration 
and asylum law 2ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), hereafter referred to as ‘Clayton’, at 
429. 
236
 Note on Burden and Standard of Proof (n 234) at para 6; UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 196. 
237
 Note on Burden and Standard of Proof (n 234) at para 6. 
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truth (beyond a reasonable doubt), nor do the facts alleged have to be proven as more 
probable than other facts (balance of probabilities).
238
  The adjudicator need merely 
establish that the claimant’s allegations are likely to be credible, based on the 
supporting evidence and the coherence and plausibility of the claimant’s testimony.
239
 
 
1.4 Section 3 and victims of human trafficking 
A victim of human trafficking may qualify for refugee status based on conditions of 
unrest in his or her country of origin or because he or she is a dependant of a 
recognised refugee, but these two circumstances will not form part of the subject matter 
of this thesis.  Instead, the concern will be whether trafficking victims, based on their 
individual experiences of being trafficked, could meet the criteria for refugee status 
contained in paragraph (a).  Obviously, the personal experiences of persons who are 
trafficked may vary.  It would thus be impossible to say conclusively that all victims of 
human trafficking would equally meet the criteria set out in paragraph (a).  However, in 
Chapters 3 and 4, the nature of the offence of human trafficking was analysed in terms 
of its international and South African legal definitions, in order to determine the likely 
characteristics of a victim of human trafficking.  From here onwards, it will thus be 
assumed that a comprehensive account has been given of the common experiences and 
attributes of trafficking victims.  The question then develops into whether a trafficked 
person, as defined and understood in the definitions discussed previously, meets the 
criteria for refugee status in paragraph (a). 
 
2 APPLYING THE ELEMENTS FOR INDIVIDUAL REFUGEE STATUS 
TO VICTIMS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
Individuals who rely on paragraph (a) for refugee status would need to fulfil the 
following five elements: 
                                                 
238
 Ibid at paras 7–8. 
239
 Note on Burden and Standard of Proof (n 234) at paras 8–12.  In other words, where facts cannot be 
ascertained but the claimant seems credible, he or she ‘should, unless there are good reasons to the 
contrary, be given the benefit of the doubt’ – UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 196 (see also paras 
197–205). 
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(i) have a well-founded fear 
(ii) of persecution 
(iii) persecution must be upon the grounds of race, tribe, religion, nationality, 
political opinion or membership of a particular social group 
(iv) alienage (being foreign to the country of asylum) 
(v) lack of protection by the country of origin because he or she is unable or 
unwilling to avail him- or herself thereof. 
It is important to note that an individual is a ‘refugee’ as soon as these elements have 
been fulfilled, regardless of whether he or she has been granted formal refugee status or 
not.
240
  Thus, the refugee status referred to in s 3 does not turn persons into refugees; it 
merely declares that they are refugees.
241
  Therefore, if victims of human trafficking 
meet the requirements, they will be refugees from the time that the requirements are 
met, not only from the time that the South African government grants them refugee 
status. 
Each of the elements will now be discussed in turn, in so far as they are relevant 
to victims of trafficking.  At the same time it will be assessed whether a victim of 
human trafficking could meet the requirements for each element based solely on the 
circumstances surrounding the trafficking event. 
 
2.1 Well-founded fear 
This element consists of both a subjective and objective requirement.
242
  A person 
applying for refugee status needs to show a subjective fear of persecution that is also 
objectively grounded in fact.
243
  The subjective requirement is acknowledged because 
‘fear’ is essentially a personal reaction or state of mind, experienced differently by 
                                                 
240
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 28. 
241
 Ibid. 
242
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at paras 37–50; Clayton (n 235) at 428. 
243
 Fang v Refugee Appeal Board and Others [2006] JOL 18635 (T) at 8. 
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different individuals.
244
  However, the subjective nature of the ‘fear’ requirement is 
qualified by a necessity that the fear be objectively ‘well-founded’.
245
 
Thus, while a determination of refugee status will be focussed on subjective 
statements by the asylum seeker concerned, and not on facts about existing conditions 
in the country of origin, these facts must also be taken into account by the administrator 
responsible for the determination.
246
  As will be discussed below, both the subjective 
and objective aspects of the ‘well-founded fear’ element could be fulfilled by a victim 
of human trafficking in South Africa. 
 
2.1.1 Subjective fear 
In the context of refugee status, the use of the ‘fear of persecution’ requirement means 
that persons need not have actually suffered persecution in order to qualify – ‘those 
who wish to avoid a situation entailing the risk of persecution’ can also qualify.
247
  
When determining whether a subjective element of fear exists, the personality, 
emotions and opinions of the applicant will have to be assessed, particularly because 
the psychological effects of persecution can vary between individuals.
248
  It is an 
assessment of whether that person ‘believes or anticipates that he/she will be subject to 
that persecution’.
249
  The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees has stated that ‘[f]ear must be reasonable’.
250
  However, ‘exaggerated fear’, 
or fear that is irrational, can meet the requirements for refugee status if ‘such a state of 
mind can be regarded as justified’ in light of the surrounding circumstances.
251
 
                                                 
244
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 37. 
245
 Ibid at para 38.  Although it is not explicitly stated as such in the ‘refugee’ definition, this is 
essentially an assessment of whether the claimant’s fear is reasonable in light of the facts surrounding his 
or her case. 
246
 Ibid at paras 37–8.  It is noted at para 39 of the UNHCR Handbook (n 110) that ‘all the circumstances 
need to be taken into account for a proper understanding of the applicant’s case’. 
247
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 45; Clayton (n 235) at 429.  Here, the use of ‘persecution’ refers 
to the narrow meaning of that concept in terms of international refugee law – see below at 2.2. 
248
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at paras 40 and 52; Clayton (n 235) at 429. 
249
 Note on Burden and Standard of Proof (n 234) at para 14. 
250
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 41. 
251
 Ibid. 
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Thus, in the case of a person who has been trafficked, it will need to be assessed 
in each individual case whether that person was indeed fearful of persecution and 
whether his or her expressions of fear can be explained with reference to his or her 
personality and particular trafficking experience.  In this regard, the credibility of the 
trafficking victim will be considered, along with all relevant circumstances, to assess 
whether there was a genuine motivation of fear.
252
   
Although it may not be true for all victims of human trafficking, it is certainly 
possible, and likely, that a trafficked person would meet the requirement of subjective 
fear.  Apart from fear that is experienced directly during the trafficking process, 
trafficked persons could also fear impending exploitation in the country of destination.  
Victims could also have a genuine fear of being trafficked again in the future. 
 
2.1.2 Objectively well-founded 
The objective assessment consists of an evaluation of the trafficked person’s testimony 
and background, in the context of the situation existing in the country of origin, both at 
the time that the person left and at the time of the assessment.
253
 
In general, the applicant’s fear should be considered well-founded if he can 
establish, to a reasonable degree, that his continued stay in his country of origin 
has become intolerable to him for the reasons stated in the definition, or would 
for the same reasons be intolerable if he returned there.
254
 
Data about the incidence and nature of human trafficking that occurs from the 
trafficking victim’s country of origin, if available and reliable, may also provide 
valuable objective information against which to evaluate the subjective fear of the 
trafficked person.  An analysis of the country of origin’s inability to protect the 
claimant from persecution could also indicate that the claimant’s fear is well-
founded.
255
  Thus, based on an assessment of the country of origin, it could well be 
demonstrated that because it was possible for the person to be trafficked in the first 
                                                 
252
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 41. 
253
 Ibid at para 42. 
254
 Ibid. 
255
 Canada (Attorney General) v Ward [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 at 39.  Hereafter referred to as ‘Ward’. 
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place, and perhaps he or she was not the first victim of the offence, conditions in the 
country of origin were ‘intolerable’ at the time of departure.  It could likewise be 
shown that, due to the prevalence of trafficking or the lack of protection and support for 
victims, it is ‘intolerable’ at the time of status determination for a victim of trafficking 
to return to the country from which he or she was trafficked. 
The subjective fear of the trafficked person could also be deemed well-founded 
because of what has happened to others who have been in a similar position to him or 
her.
256
  In other words, justification for the fear may be perceived from the experiences 
of others also – not just from the experience of the trafficking victim him- or herself.
257
  
Again, each trafficked person’s case will have to be assessed based on its own merits.  
Nevertheless, there are certainly situations in which the fear of trafficked persons 
would be objectively justifiable where there is reliable knowledge of these fears being 
realised in the case of other trafficked persons.  For example, a trafficking victim’s fear 
of being exploited by his or her traffickers could be objectively justified by evidence 
that other trafficking victims, in similar positions to the victim under assessment, were 
exploited during or after their trafficking experiences.  
 
2.1.3 The standard of proof for establishing that a fear is objectively well-founded 
Although the standard of proof for refugee claims generally is based on the likelihood 
of the facts alleged, a specific standard applies to establishing the well-foundedness of 
a claim.  There have been a series of international cases debating the standard of proof 
that should apply regarding a well-founded fear.
258
  However, it now appears to be 
                                                 
256
 In Chaudri v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1986] 69 N.R. 114, the Canadian 
Federal Court accepted an applicant’s testimony about the persecution suffered by persons who were in a 
similar position to him – at paras 7 and 12 of the judgment. 
257
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 43. 
258
 See, for example: INS v Stevic 467 U.S. 407 (1984) (‘reasonable possibility’ test); INS v Cardoza-
Fonseca 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (‘reasonable possibility’ test); Fernandez v Government of Singapore 1971 
WL 37421 (HL); [1971] 2 All ER 691 (‘reasonable chance’ or ‘serious possibility’ test); R v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department ex parte Sivakuraman (1988) 1 All ER 193 (HL) (‘reasonable degree of 
likelihood’ test); Chan Yee Kin v The Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1989] HCA 62; 
(1989) 169 CLR 379 (‘real chance’ test); Joseph Adjei v Minister of Employment and Immigration 1976 
R.S.C. 52 (‘reasonable chance’ test); and Salibian v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) 
A-479-89 (24 May 1990) (‘reasonable possibility’ test).  See descriptions of these cases in the Annex to 
Note on Burden and Standard of Proof (n 234). 
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established by international jurisprudence that a fear of persecution will be deemed 
‘well-founded’ if persecution is proven to be ‘reasonably possible’.
259
  This is also the 
standard that has been adopted in South Africa.
260
  A victim of human trafficking 
would therefore only be required to show that there is a reasonable possibility that he or 
she will be persecuted in order to establish that his or her fear is well-founded.  This 
will be discussed further below. 
 
2.2 Persecution 
In order to qualify for refugee status under s 3(a), ‘a well-founded fear of persecution’ 
(emphasis added) must have been the motive for departing from the country of origin 
or the reason for not wanting to return to the country of origin.
261
  Fleeing solely for 
fear of famine, economic hardship or natural disaster, for example, does not qualify one 
for refugee status.
262
 
 
2.2.1 What is ‘persecution’? 
Although the precise meaning of ‘persecution’ is not agreed upon,
263
 it is accepted that 
any threat to a person’s life or freedom, where that threat is based on one of the listed 
grounds of persecution, would constitute persecution.
264
  Related to this, it is widely 
accepted that where the human rights of an individual are to be seriously violated, also 
based on one of the listed grounds, such violation would amount to ‘persecution’.
265
  In 
this respect, both commissions and omissions should be able to constitute ‘persecution’ 
                                                 
259
 Note on Burden and Standard of Proof (n 234) at 17; Clayton (n 235) at 430–2. 
260
 Fang v Refugee Appeal Board and Others [2006] JOL 18635 (T), at 8. 
261
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 39. 
262
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at paras 39 and 62–4; James Hathaway The law of refugee status 
(Ontario: Butterworths, 1991), hereafter referred to as ‘Hathaway’, at 117–19.  See also Shacknove (n 
216) at 278–9, who argues for a more inclusive notion of refugees that deems ‘persecution’ as ‘a 
sufficient, but not a necessary’ basis for refugee status.  Shacknove argues further at 279 that ‘other 
threats to physical security’ also qualify as valid bases for being a refugee. 
263
 Hathaway (n 262) at 102; Goodwin-Gill (n 59) at 90–2; Clayton (n 235) at 435–6.  Hathaway (n 262) 
defines ‘persecution’ at 104–5 as ‘the sustained or systemic violation of basic human rights 
demonstrative of a failure of state protection’ [footnotes omitted]. 
264
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 51; Hathaway (n 262) at 106–8; Goodwin-Gill (n 59) at 92; 
Gallagher (n 2) at 109. 
265
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 51.  See also Hathaway (n 262) at 106–8. 
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since human rights could be violated by action or inaction.
266
  Other than these two 
clear examples of persecution, an individual assessment of the existence or threat of 
‘persecution’ will have to be made based on the circumstances of each case.
267
 
 
2.2.1.1 Human rights violations as ‘persecution’ 
With regard to human rights violations that are serious enough to constitute 
persecution, Hathaway points to those fundamental rights ‘which all states are bound to 
respect as a minimum condition of legitimacy’.
268
  Referring to the rights contained in 
the UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR, Hathaway categorises rights into four categories – 
only some of which will constitute persecution.
269
  The first category permits no 
derogation by states, even in emergencies, and includes inter alia the right to life, 
prohibition against torture, freedom from slavery and freedom of religion.
270
  South 
Africa also regards the right to dignity at s 10 of the Constitution as an entirely non-
derogable right, even during states of emergency.
271
  Any violation of the rights in this 
category constitutes ‘persecution’ for the purposes of refugee status because it is 
indicative of the state’s failure to ensure the protection of these non-derogable rights.
272
  
The second category consists of rights such as the right to equality, the right to privacy, 
fair trial rights, freedom of movement and freedom of expression.
273
  These are rights 
that are internationally recognised but that can be derogated from in the case of state 
emergencies, and a violation of these rights will therefore constitute persecution only 
where the derogation was not the result of a state emergency.
274
  The third category 
consists of socio-economic and cultural rights, but the violation of these can only 
                                                 
266
 For example, the right to privacy could be violated where a person’s home is searched (commission), 
while the right to health care could be violated where the state fails to take reasonable steps to provide 
basic health care services (omission). 
267
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 52. 
268
 Hathaway (n 262) at 106.  At 92–3, Goodwin-Gill (n 59) refers similarly to ‘obligations erga omnes’ 
and mentions most of those rights also included by Hathaway. 
269
 Hathaway (n 262) at 108–112.  Hathaway’s categorisation is also discussed in Clayton (n 235) at 
436–7. 
270
 Hathaway (n 262) at 108–9. 
271
 See table at s 37 of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996. 
272
 Hathaway (n 262) at 109. 
273
 Ibid. 
274
 Ibid at 109–110. 
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constitute persecution where rights in the first two categories are adversely affected, or 
where the third category rights are denied on a discriminatory basis.
275
  The final 
category comprises those rights which, while in the UDHR, are not in the Covenants.
276
  
According to Hathaway, a violation of one of these rights alone can never amount to 
persecution as states are not obliged to ensure their protection in the first place.
277
 
As has been discussed in Chapter 4, the offence of human trafficking poses 
potential threats to several human rights.  These include rights to:  life, dignity, security 
of the person, bodily integrity, privacy, protection from slavery, freedom of movement, 
family unity, fair labour conditions, and a safe environment.  Of these, only the right to 
life and protection against slavery seem to fall within Hathaway’s first category of 
rights.  In the South African context, the right of trafficking victims to dignity would 
also fall within this category.  Thus, where a trafficking victim’s right to life dignity or 
protection from slavery is at risk of violation, such violation would amount to 
persecution.  If trafficking is to be considered as ‘modern-day slavery’
278
 then it is 
further arguable that the trafficking process in its entirety will always be persecutory on 
account of the country of origin’s failure to ensure that victims are not trafficked and 
subjected to slavery or related forms of servitude.  Even if one cannot make the 
assumption that all trafficking is persecution, several category two rights are affected 
by the trafficking incident.  Thus, where the country of origin is not in a state of 
emergency and fails to protect the trafficking victim’s rights to privacy, bodily 
integrity, security of the person, or freedom of movement, the violations of these rights 
would constitute persecution.  Employment and family rights of trafficking victims fall 
into the third category of rights and can therefore only constitute persecution on their 
own where they are violated discriminatorily, or where there are sufficient resources to 
protect them.  Finally, the right to a safe environment, although included within the 
South African Bill of Rights at s 24,
279
 is not included in the UDHR and would 
                                                 
275
 Ibid at 110–111.  Furthermore, where the failure to ensure these rights is based on lack of resources, it 
will not constitute persecution – Hathaway (n 262) at 112 and 116–24. 
276
 Ibid at 111. 
277
 Ibid. 
278
 See Chapter 2. 
279
 Constitution of South Africa, 1996. 
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therefore not fall into any one of Hathaway’s four categories.  The violation of this 
right during the trafficking process is therefore unlikely to constitute persecution. 
 
2.2.1.2 Exploitation as ‘persecution’ 
Another aspect of human trafficking may be considered as ‘persecution’ for the 
purposes of refugee status: exploitation.  However, it is important to note that victims 
of human trafficking may or may not have been exploited during or after the trafficking 
process.  As discussed in Chapter 4, the definition of ‘trafficking’ separates actual 
exploitation from trafficking conduct which is undertaken for the purpose of 
exploitation.  Thus, in order to be a victim of trafficking, no exploitation need actually 
have taken place after the trafficking process.  However, exploitation can occur as part 
of the trafficking process also.  It is thus possible that someone who qualifies as a 
victim of trafficking has actually already been exploited – whether such exploitation 
occurred during or after the trafficking process.  Where ‘exploitation’ is synonymous 
with ‘persecution’ this could mean that the trafficking victim has either already been 
persecuted during or after the trafficking process, or that it was intended that he or she 
be exploited and that persecution is thus a future possibility.  In the either case, where a 
fear of such (past or future) persecution exists, the trafficking victim could qualify for 
refugee status. 
Thus, is ‘exploitation’ in the context of human trafficking synonymous with 
‘persecution’?  Despite ambiguities in the definition of ‘exploitation’ within the 
Palermo Protocol and South African Bill, if one considers the harms that are included 
within the scope of ‘exploitation’,
280
 the potential for a number of human rights 
violations is evident.  Exploitation could mean the violation of rights to freedom of 
security and bodily integrity, freedom from slavery, and the rights to life, privacy, fair 
labour conditions and a safe environment.  At the very least, exploitation would violate 
the victim’s dignity – whether such dignity is protected as a fundamental human right 
(as is the case in South Africa)
281
 or whether dignity is merely the value that underlies 
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 See Chapter 3. 
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the other international human rights.  If one follows Hathaway’s reasoning above, then 
‘exploitation’, as described in the trafficking instruments, would in the correct 
circumstances certainly constitute ‘persecution’ in terms of all violated rights, except 
those relating to the environment.  Thus, ‘exploitation’ is not synonymous with 
‘persecution’ in terms of the trafficking legislation, but it usually amounts to 
‘persecution’ in individual cases because of the human rights violations that it involves.  
In those cases, fear of exploitation could therefore constitute fear of persecution and the 
definitional element for refugee status could be met. 
 
2.2.1.3 Sufficiency of state protection 
It was held by the House of Lords in Horvath that where the state is not the persecutor, 
lack of state protection must be shown at both the ‘unable or unwilling’ stage of the 
status determination and also when considering whether there was a well-founded fear 
of persecution.
282
  Thus, where there is sufficient state protection, in other words, 
where the state can and will offer protection, it could be held that there is well-founded 
fear of violence or harm, rather than of persecution.
283
  It was furthermore held that 
protection could be deemed ‘sufficient’ even where the state could not guarantee that 
all dangers had been eradicated – a practical standard had to be applied based on the 
reasonableness of the state’s fulfilment of the duty to protect its nationals.
284
  The 
sufficiency of state protection in relation to trafficking victims will therefore have to be 
assessed in each case, and the presence of a fear of persecution may be negated as a 
result.  State protection could be deemed sufficient where reasonable anti-trafficking 
laws and policies have been put in place, for example. 
 
 
                                                 
282
 Horvath v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 1 AC 489; [2000] 3 WLR 379, 
hereafter ‘Horvath’.  For a comprehensive analysis of the decision in Horvath, see Hélène Lambert ‘The 
conceptualisation of “persecution” by the House of Lords: Horvath v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department’ (2001) 13 IJRL 16. 
283
 See Horvath (n 282).  This supports Hathaway’s (n 262) definition at 104–5 of ‘persecution’, which 
maintains that persecution consists of ‘the … violation of basic human rights demonstrative of a failure 
of state protection’ [emphasis added]. 
284
 See Horvath (n 282). 
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2.2.2 A subjective assessment 
As in the context of ‘fear’, ‘persecution’ includes a subjective component.  This is 
because what one person views as ‘persecution’ might not constitute ‘persecution’ in 
the view of another.
285
  Persons could qualify for refugee status because they 
subjectively believe that they might be persecuted, even where an objective assessment 
of their situation does not perceive any risk of persecution.  It is therefore necessary to 
take into account the personal nature of the applicant for refugee status when assessing 
whether any actual or threatened harm committed against him or her amounts to 
‘persecution’.
286
  However, unlike the element of ‘fear’, the subjective nature of 
persecution is not qualified by an objective assessment of facts or an objective notion 
of what would constitute ‘persecution’.  Thus, if the acts or threats would have been 
interpreted as ‘persecution’ by the particular asylum seeker concerned, even where they 
do not meet the usual criteria for ‘persecution’, those acts or threats could amount to 
‘persecution’ for the purpose of the refugee status.  Obviously, a credibility assessment 
of the claimant becomes very important in a scenario such as this – in terms of each 
claimant it will have to be ascertained whether there is a genuine perception of past or 
future ‘persecution’. 
In the case of trafficking victims, this would mean that the outcome of 
individual cases may depend on the perceptions and personality of the victim 
concerned.  In other words, where a victim genuinely considers what has happened to 
him or her, or what is being threatened against him or her, to be ‘persecution’, then the 
definitional requirements for persecution could be met, even where no human rights 
violations are present or imminent.  This could be problematic in the context of 
trafficking victims because victims of crime react differently to their victimisation and 
use different methods to cope with it.
287
  Thus, victims may specifically reject the 
notion of ‘persecution’ in order to make light of the ordeal that they have endured, in 
the same way that victims may want to call themselves ‘survivors’ instead of ‘victims’ 
                                                 
285
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 52. 
286
 Ibid. 
287
 Fattah (n 109) at 50–1. 
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to avert the weakness and vulnerability that is associated with victimisation.
288
  In a 
case where the victim does not want to subjectively accept the extent or magnitude of 
his or her suffering, the RSDO may deem the persecution requirement unfulfilled 
where what is feared by the victim actually does amount to ‘persecution’.  However, it 
is submitted that in those cases the RSDO’s determination would have to be based on 
the severity of the human rights violations that have occurred or that are likely to occur 
if refugee status is not granted.
289
 
The subjective nature of the requirement presents a further difficulty in the 
context of trafficking victims: they are put at risk of secondary victimisation by the 
need for credibility assessments.  The term ‘secondary victimisation’ refers to 
‘insensitive or other disrespectful or harsh treatment by criminal justice officials [that 
serves] as a source of additional distress for victims’.
290
  As victims of crime, 
trafficking victims are therefore ordinarily at risk of secondary victimisation by police 
officials, prosecutors or judges.  Furthermore, the administrative procedure for refugee 
status determination could be daunting for any applicant, but the experience will be 
worsened by credibility assessments, especially where these are conducted harshly or 
insensitively by administrators.  For trafficking victims, this could amount to further 
victimisation, which they experience in addition to the secondary victimisation 
associated with the criminal justice system. 
 
2.2.3 Persecution, discrimination and punishment 
Persecution may consist of a single act or threat (where serious enough)
291
 or the 
sustained repetition of the same act or threat, or a number of different acts or threats 
                                                 
288
 Gould (n 88) notes at 21–2 that victims of trafficking are often reluctant to identify themselves as 
victims. 
289
 As discussed previously, a person who has been trafficked would most likely meet the threshold for 
‘persecution’ because of all the human rights violations associated with the trafficking process. 
290
 Bruce (n 31) at 102. 
291
 Despite Hathaway’s (n 262) assertion at 102 that ‘persecution’ must be ‘sustained or systemic... rather 
than just an isolated incident of harm’, Goodwin-Gill (n 59) does not include these concepts within his 
description of ‘persecution’ at 131–2.  It is the view of this thesis that a single event can amount to 
persecution, because one devastating event could be sufficiently harmful so as to amount to persecution 
in the mind of the person that had to endure it.  This is also the conclusion reached by Clayton (n 235) at 
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considered collectively.  Thus, where an individual act that does not on its own amount 
to persecution is committed against the claimant, together with another act that is 
harmful but does not amount to persecution, or in the presence of another adverse 
circumstance, it could constitute ‘persecution’ if the acts and circumstances are 
considered jointly.
292
  Here, one could consider the example of a person who is verbally 
affronted by a government official or a member of the public for wearing a religious 
garment or icon.  While this act may amount to religious discrimination, it cannot on its 
own constitute ‘persecution’.
293
  However, if that same person experiences a similar 
discriminatory affront on various other occasions,
294
 or the single affront is made 
within a tense climate of religious intolerance, the seemingly immaterial act could very 
well be perceived as ‘persecution’ by the person concerned.  This perception is 
especially likely where the continued discrimination or surrounding factors ‘produce, in 
the mind of the person concerned, a feeling of apprehension and insecurity’.
295
  In that 
case, the applicant’s claim would be based on ‘cumulative grounds’ of persecution.
296
  
Generally speaking, the acts and means and purposes involved in human 
trafficking are not discriminatory and can therefore not amount to persecution on that 
basis.  However, one could argue that the trafficking of women necessarily involves 
acts of gender discrimination as human trafficking is just another manifestation of 
gender-based violence and abuse.  A variety of acts, like female genital mutilation, 
sexual violence and forced prostitution, committed during the trafficking process are 
gender-specific so that the trafficking process itself, as well as the exploitation 
associated with it, can constitute persecution in the form of gender discrimination.
297
  
The discriminatory nature of human trafficking is accentuated by the harsh reality that 
                                                                                                                                              
438–9, who states at 439 that a human rights approach to persecution supports the notion that ‘a single 
instance of sufficiently severe ill-treatment may amount to persecution’. 
292
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at paras 53 and 201; Clayton (n 235) at 444–7. 
293
 Discrimination can only amount to persecution where ‘measures of discrimination lead to 
consequences of a substantially prejudicial nature for the person concerned’, where for example, there 
are serious limitations on the exercise of his or her rights – UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 54. 
294
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 55. 
295
 Ibid. 
296
 Ibid at paras 53 and 55.  An assessment of whether ‘cumulative grounds’ exist will need to be based 
on the circumstances of each case and the ‘particular geographical, historical and ethnological context’ 
will therefore need to be considered – UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 53. 
297
 Gallagher (n 2) at 107–8. 
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most victims of human trafficking are women, rather than men.
298
  If one accepts this 
approach, then most, if not all, female victims of human trafficking would meet the 
‘persecution’ requirement because the trafficking endured by them constitutes a process 
of sustained discrimination or various discriminatory events, which, when considered 
together, amount to persecution. 
A claimant may also fear persecution in the form of punishment for acts 
allegedly committed by him or her in the country of origin.  This is particularly relevant 
for victims of human trafficking because, despite the Bill’s stipulation that trafficking 
victims are not to be treated as offenders or criminal participants,
299
 victims could be 
prosecuted and punished for illegal acts committed in the country of origin or 
elsewhere, such as the unlawful departure from that country,
300
 that they were involved 
in during the trafficking process.  This is especially pertinent where it is unclear that 
they are actually trafficking victims, or where the country in which they face 
prosecution is not a member to the Palermo Protocol. 
However, in the context of refugee law, ‘punishment’ (or ‘prosecution’) and 
‘persecution’ are ordinarily distinguished so that fugitives from the law do not qualify 
for refugee status.
301
  Exceptions are however made where the punishment likely to be 
endured by the claimant is excessively harsh, so that the severity of the punishment 
renders it persecutory.
302
  Punishment may also amount to persecution where the 
punishment concerned is discriminatory on one of the listed grounds – for example, 
where prosecution will be commenced against a person particularly because he or she 
has a so-called ‘unlawful’ political opinion or religious view.
303
  In order to prove 
persecution in these cases, the relevant prevailing legal rules and their implementation 
by the government in the country of origin concerned will have to be considered as 
evidence.
304
  Obviously, where the person has a fear of prosecution and punishment, 
                                                 
298
 Snyman (n 2) at 284. 
299
 See clause 16 of the Bill, titled ‘Criminal prosecution against victim of trafficking prohibited’. 
300
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 61. 
301
 Ibid at para 56. 
302
 Ibid at para 57; Clayton (n 235) at 443–4. 
303
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 57. 
304
 Ibid at para 59.  The laws of the country of origin can be considered by comparing it to the domestic 
laws of the country in which asylum is being sought, and also by comparing it to international human 
rights standards and norms – UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 60. 
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but also has a well-founded fear of persecution, that person will qualify for refugee 
status – provided that the seriousness of the offence for which he or she faces 
prosecution does not exclude his or her claim for refugee status.
305
 
In the case of trafficking victims, the prosecution that they could face in a 
country of origin or transit may amount to persecution for the purposes of qualifying 
for refugee status in South Africa.  However, there is no way of determining whether 
all trafficking victims in general could meet the ‘persecution’ requirement on this basis 
as the penal laws to be applied to the claimant will have to be assessed in each 
individual case. 
 
2.2.4 The forward-looking nature of the test 
An important aspect of the ‘persecution’ element is the requirement that the relevant 
administrator’s assessment be forward-looking – an evaluation of the risk of 
persecution based on the claimant’s personal circumstances and also the prevailing 
circumstances of the country of origin.
306
  In other words, in order to qualify for 
refugee status, the claimant must, at the time of the application, have a well-founded 
fear of persecution, in respect of future persecution that may take place should he or 
she return to the country of or gin.  This principle ensures that where circumstances 
have changed for the better in the country of origin, the claimant will no longer seek 
the protection of a foreign country.  The rationale is that where the authorities of the 
country of origin are the agents of persecution, a sufficient change in circumstances 
would render continued protection unnecessary, or, where another entity is the agent of 
the persecution, that the country of origin will now provide the protection required by 
the refugee claimant.  As mentioned previously, in relation to a fear of present or future 
persecution, the RSDO will have to assess the reasonable possibility, at the time that 
                                                 
305
 Ibid at para 58.  Note that a claimant can be excluded from qualifying for refugee status, which he or 
she would otherwise have qualified for, in terms of arts 1D, 1E and 1F of the UN Refugee Convention 
and s 4 of South Africa’s Refugees Act.  The exclusion of victims of human trafficking from qualifying 
for refugee status will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
306
 Note on Burden and Standard of Proof (n 234) at para 18–9; Clayton (235) at 430.  For a 
comprehensive discussion of the prospective nature of the assessment, see Hathaway (n 262) at 66–75. 
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the assessment is made, of such persecution actually taking place, in order to determine 
whether the claimant’s fear is deserving of protection in the form of refugee status. 
In the context of victims of trafficking, this means that any past exploitation or 
harm that is experienced during or after trafficking, but which amounts to persecution, 
will not be considered as a basis for refugee status.  The trafficking victim will have to 
show that he or she still fears present or future persecution at the time of status 
determination.  This requirement could be met in a number of situations: where victims 
fear that upon return they will be re-victimised or re-trafficked;
307
 where victims fear 
retribution from their traffickers, either against themselves or family members, for 
escaping capture, aiding in the prosecution of the traffickers or failing to pay off 
bondage debts; where victims fear being ostracised by family members or communities 
upon return; or where victims fear punishment from the authorities in the country of 
origin.
308
 
Although not conclusive, past persecution will be a strong indication of the 
possibility of future persecution.
309
  However, where a reasonable possibility of future 
persecution is found to be absent, the existence of past persecution could also be 
sufficient for refugee status, in certain circumstances.  Thus, it has been held in the 
Matter of Chen decision that where past persecution is severe enough to make the 
claimant genuinely fear return to the country of origin, then proof of past persecution, 
not the likelihood of future persecution, is sufficient for refugee status.
310
  Thus, 
refugee status was granted was granted in that case for humanitarian reasons despite the 
lack of possible present or future persecution.
311
  It was similarly held in the South 
African case of Mayongo v Refugee Appeal Board and Others
312
 that a man who was 
                                                 
307
 It was stated in Streanga v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2008 FC 231; 70 Imm. 
L.R. (3d) 236 that ‘[t]he evidence is that persons of this kind endeavour to recapture their former victims 
and seek to traffic them again or to punish them’ (para 5).  In that case a woman feared to return to 
Romania because the men who had trafficked her to work as an exotic dancer and prostitute in Hungary 
had been released from prison and were thus free to recapture her.  Van der Hoven and Maree (n 14) also 
indicate at 67 that persons who have already been victims of crime are generally more susceptible to 
future victimisation. 
308
 Gallagher (n 2) at 108–9; Dauvergne (n 1) at 87. 
309
 Note on Burden and Standard of Proof (n 234) at para 19. 
310
 Matter of Chen Interim Decision 3104 (1989) US. 
311
 Ibid at 4–6. 
312
 [2007] JOL 19645 (T).  Hereafter referred to as ‘Mayongo’. 
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still suffering the effects of past persecution could qualify for refugee status, because 
his medical condition ‘constituted a compelling reason to refuse to avail himself of the 
[country of origin’s] protection’.
313
  This was because he suffered from post traumatic 
stress syndrome and severe depression – psychological conditions which would only 
worsen if he was to return to the source of his persecution.
314
 
As far as trafficking victims are concerned, this would mean that if it could be 
shown that the exploitation or harm suffered in the past was sufficiently serious to 
warrant the claimant’s desire to remain within South Africa’s protective jurisdiction, 
then proof of the past persecution will be enough to qualify the claimant for refugee 
status.  It is certainly possible that the circumstances of some trafficking situations will 
have been so severe that trafficking victims would fear returning to the country of 
origin despite persecution being only a fact of the past and not a possibility of the 
present or future.  It is also possible that the effects of the trafficking victimisation, 
such as post traumatic stress, depression or paranoia
315
 are of the nature that the 
victim’s condition would deteriorate upon return to the country of origin.  It is therefore 
submitted that some trafficking victims would indeed meet the requirements for past 
persecution (and its continuing effects) where a fear of present or future persecution 
cannot be proven as an element of refugee status. 
 
2.2.5 The agents of persecution 
Although persecution is ordinarily associated with the government or leadership of the 
country of origin, other persons or entities can also be the agents of persecutory acts or 
threats.
316
  In other words, despite laws and government policy prohibiting such 
conduct, members of the public or other group entities may undertake to persecute an 
individual based on one of the grounds listed in s 3(a) of the definition.  In order to 
constitute ‘persecution’ in these cases where the government itself is not the agent of 
                                                 
313
 Mayongo (n 312) at para [9]. 
314
 Ibid at para [3]. 
315
 Discussed in Chapter 4. 
316
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at 65; Goodwin-Gill (n 59) at 98; Clayton (n 235) at 447–51.  See also the 
decision in Ward (n 255) at 37 and 39–45. 
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persecution, the acts or threats must either be ‘knowingly tolerated by the authorities, 
or [the authorities must] refuse, or prove unable, to offer effective protection’.
317
 
In the context of human trafficking, the agents of persecution are primarily the 
perpetrators of the trafficking offence.  The offence of human trafficking can have one 
single perpetrator, but usually there are a number of persons involved in the trafficking 
process.
318
  These persons are most frequently private persons or groupings, sometimes 
even known or related to the victim, and would qualify as appropriate agents of 
persecution in order to meet the refugee ‘definition’.  However, there are also cases 
where state officials or administrators assist in the trafficking process by corruptly 
accepting bribes to ignore trafficking conduct or falsifying documents to ease the 
transit of trafficking victims, for example.  In these cases, it is arguable that because the 
person was acting in his or her official capacity while facilitating the trafficking, he or 
she is also an agent of the trafficking persecution despite the fact that such conduct is 
ultra vires the official’s position.
319
  Where an employee of the state is an agent of 
persecution while acting in his or her official c pacity, the state itself may then also be 
responsible as an agent of persecution – no matter how removed the official’s act was 
from state control.
320
  Obviously, corrupt officials can be found in countries of origin, 
transit and/or destination.  Thus, a scenario may arise where the country within which 
asylum is being sought is actually partially to blame as agents of the persecution. 
The agents of persecution will not only be those persons involved in the 
trafficking process.  As discussed earlier, actual exploitation endured by or threatened 
against the victim of trafficking could also constitute persecution.  Thus, the persons 
responsible for, or those who would be responsible for, the victim’s exploitation will 
also be agents of persecution.  These persons may be different to the persons who were 
involved in the process of trafficking victim.  For example, exploiters in the country of 
                                                 
317
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 65. 
318
 As discussed in Chapter 4. 
319
 See Hathaway (n 262) at 126–7.  The officials and administrators would be deemed perpetrators of 
trafficking-related offences in terms of clauses 4, 6 or 8 of the Bill.  
320
 See International Law Commission Draft articles on Responsibility of States for internationally 
wrongful acts (November 2001), available at: http://www.ilsa.org/jessup/jessup06/basicmats2/DASR.pdf 
[accessed 7 February 2011], at Chapter II (Attribution of conduct to a State). 
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destination may pay other persons to traffic victims to them from the country of origin 
so that they can be exploited by them in the country of destination. 
Finally, where the relevant persecution is in the form of discrimination, the 
agent of persecution will be the group or person who has performed the discriminatory 
acts.  Where the trafficking victim has a fear of persecution upon return to his or her 
country of origin in the form of prosecution and punishment, the agents of persecution 
will be the authorities or state bodies responsible for criminal justice in the country of 
origin. 
 
2.3 Grounds 
In order to meet the definitional requirements for refugee status, a person has to have a 
well-founded fear of persecution that is based on one or more, sometimes overlapping, 
grounds:  race, tribe, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership of a 
particular social group.
321
  In other words, the persecution that is feared must be 
threatened or committed because the person being persecuted is of a particular race, 
tribe, religion, or nationality, holds a particular political opinion, or is a member of a 
particular social group.
322
  This element therefore includes a requirement that there be a 
nexus, or causative link, between the feared persecution and one of the listed grounds. 
Several possible reasons exist for the targeting of a particular social group by 
persecutors.  For example, where the agent of persecution is the government of the 
country of origi , the social group may be targeted because they obstruct governmental 
power or have dissident political views.
323
  Or, where the agent of persecution is some 
other entity, the persecution may be directed at a particular group because of 
intolerance, revenge or financial profit.  Unless it is warranted sufficient by the severity 
of the circumstances, merely belonging to the social group may not be enough to 
                                                 
321
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 66–7.  Where a claimant him- or herself does not know the reason 
for his or her feared persecution, it is the duty of the relevant status determination administrator to 
ascertain the possible basis for persecution and to decide whether there is a valid claim for refugee status 
– UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 66–7.  
322
 Clayton (n 235) at 458–60. 
323
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 77–8.  In this example, the ground ‘membership of a particular 
social group’ would obviously overlap with the ‘political opinion’ ground. 
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qualify for refugee status – the claimant may need to show that the persecutors were 
aware or would become aware of his or her membership in the group.
324
 
It is difficult to determine a basis upon which victims of trafficking could claim 
a fear of persecution.  In individual cases, it may well be that the persecution feared by 
victims is to be directed at them because they are of a particular race, tribe, religion, 
nationality, or have a certain political opinion.
325
  However, these reasons for 
persecution could never be applied to all trafficking victims equally.  The issue then is 
whether trafficking victims generally can claim that they are persecuted or face 
persecution because they belong to a particular social group?  If so, what ‘social group’ 
could they be said to belong to?
326
 
In the context of refugee law, a ‘social group’ has been described as consisting 
of ‘persons of similar background, habits or social status’.
327
  However this type of 
broad conception of a ‘social group’ poses the danger that several groups will be 
brought within the scope of refugee status that were never intended, by the drafters of 
the UN Refugee Convention, to receive protection.
328
  Similarly broad is the 
interpretation that ‘membership of a particular social group’ is a ‘safety net’ ground – 
encompassing all persecution that is based on something other than race, religion, 
nationality or political opinion.
329
  However, other interpretations have asserted that 
determinations about the content of ‘membership of a particular social group’ should be 
                                                 
324
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 79. 
325
 UNHCR Guidelines (n 79) at paras 33–6.  For example, evidence has shown that many children 
trafficked out of Romania are chosen as victims because they belong to the Roma race of people – 
Dragomir v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2008 FC 1241; 76 Imm. L.R. (3d) 302.  
For a general discussion of all these grounds, see the UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at paras 68–76 and 
paras 80–86; Hathaway (n 262) at 141–57; Goodwin-Gill (n 59) at 70–73 and 86–90; Clayton (n 235) at 
460–2 and 474–80. 
326
 Many claims for asylum by victims of trafficking seem to fail because they fail to show that they 
belonged to a particular social group that was a target of persecution – see Gallagher (n 2) at 111–15. 
327
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 77; Gallagher (n 2) at 109.  Thus, for example, a specific family of 
persons was held to constitute a ‘particular social group’ for the purposes of refugee status in the case of 
Alberto R Gonzales, Attorney General v Michelle Thomas et al 547 U.S. (2006).  See also Hathaway (n 
262) at 164–6 and Clayton (n 235) at 471–3 for a discussion of the social group ‘family’ in the context of 
refugee claims. 
328
 Hathaway (n 262) at 158–60. 
329
 Ward (n 255) at 63–9.  See also Hathaway (n 262) at 158–60, who argues against ‘membership of a 
particular social group’ being a residual ground for refugee status. 
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guided by the concept of discrimination.
330
  This is because the other listed grounds of 
persecution, like race, religion and nationality, are also recognised grounds of 
discrimination, which find their origin in fundamental human rights instruments like 
the UDHR and ICCPR.
331
   
A narrower interpretation of the concept ‘social group’, which does not link the 
ground to discrimination, was enumerated in the Matter of Acosta
332
 decision.
333
  The 
meaning of ‘social group’ was interpreted, by the United States Board of Immigration 
Appeals, in relation to the other listed grounds as follows: 
We find the well-established doctrine of ejusdem generis, meaning literally, ‘of 
the same kind,’ to be most helpful in construing the phrase ‘membership in a 
particular social group.’ That doctrine holds that general words used in an 
enumeration with specific words should be construed in a manner consistent 
with the specific words.... The other grounds of persecution ... listed in 
association with ‘membership in a particular social group’ are persecution on 
account of ‘race,’ ‘religion,’ ‘nationality,’ and ‘political opinion.’ Each of these 
grounds describes persecution aimed at an immutable characteristic: a 
characteristic that either is beyond the power of an individual to change or is so 
fundamental to individual identity or conscience that it ought not be required to 
be changed..... 
 
Applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis, we interpret the phrase ‘persecution 
on account of membership in a particular social group’ to mean persecution that 
is directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons all of 
whom share a common, immutable characteristic. The shared characteristic 
                                                 
330
 Ward (n 255) at 71.  See also Goodwin-Gill (n 59) at 70.  Thus, sexual orientation, a recognised 
ground of discrimination, represents the shared characteristic of the group ‘homosexual persons’, with 
the result that the group is recognised as a ‘social group’ in the context of refugee status. 
331
 Ward (n 255) at 69–72. 
332
 19 I. & N. Dec. 211; Interim Decision 2986; 1985 WL 56042 (BIA), hereafter referred to as ‘Matter 
of Acosta’. 
333
 At 161, Hathaway (n 262) seems to agree with the interpretation in Acosta and states that the ‘social 
group’ test established there is ‘sufficiently open-ended to allow for evolution in much the same way as 
has occurred with the four other grounds, but not so vague as to admit persons without a serious basis for 
claim to international protection’ [footnotes omitted]. 
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might be an innate one such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some 
circumstances it might be a shared past experience such as former military 
leadership or land ownership. The particular kind of group characteristic that 
will qualify under this construction remains to be determined on a case-by-case 
basis.
334
 
Therefore, where persons can dissociate from a group or where a group defines itself 
by characteristics that can be changed, that group will not be deemed a ‘social 
group’.
335
 
 
2.3.1 Female victims of human trafficking 
It is accepted that gender is an immutable characteristic for the purpose of the ‘refugee’ 
definition,
336
 and gender is also an established ground for discrimination.
337
  Gender 
groups can therefore constitute particular ‘social groups’.
338
  Therefore, a fear of 
gender-based persecution can qualify a claimant for refugee status.
339
  In the context of 
victims of human trafficking, this means that a large number of victims can be included 
as a social group.  As discussed previously, trafficking itself is a gendered crime that 
includes gender-specific violence and is directed predominantly at female victims.  
Women are easy targets for traffickers because of their vulnerability.  Female victims 
of trafficking could therefore argue that they are being, or at risk of being, persecuted 
                                                 
334
 Matter of Acosta (n 332) at 233. 
335
 Hathaway (n 262) at 161.  A ‘social perception approach’ to the meaning of ‘social group’ similarly 
maintains that where persons share a common characteristic that sets them apart from society, as 
perceived by society, they can constitute a social group in refugee law – Gallagher (n 2) at 109–10. 
336
 Hathaway (n 262) at 162–3; Goodwin-Gill (n 59) at 81–4; Gallagher (n 2) at 105. 
337
 See, for example: UDHR at art 2; the ICCPR at arts 2 and 3; Constitution of South Africa, 1996 at s 9. 
338
 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Guidelines on international protection: gender 
related persecution within the context of article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol 
relating to the status of refugees HRC/GIP/02/01 (7 May 2002). 
339
 Gallagher (n 2) at 105.  Gallagher notes at 106 that acts of gender-based persecution generally 
include: 
… acts of sexual violence, family or domestic violence, coerced family planning, female genital 
mutilation, forced marriages, dowry murders, punishment for failure to obey social norms, 
honor killings, discrimination against homosexuals and forced prostitution.’ 
See also Jenna Shearer Demir ‘Trafficking of women for sexual exploitation: a gender-based well-
founded fear?’ (UNHCR, Working Paper No 80, 2003), available at http://www.jha.ac/articles/a115.pdf 
[accessed 19 January 2011]. 
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by traffickers because they are women.
340
  Thus, the social group relevant to a large 
proportion of trafficking victims is that of ‘women’. 
 
2.3.2 Victims of human trafficking as a social group? 
For those victims of human trafficking that do not fall into the social group ‘women’, it 
is possible that they could constitute a social group in and of themselves due to the fact 
that they are all persons who have been victims of the offence of human trafficking.
341
  
Thus, while being a victim of human trafficking is not an ‘innate’ characteristic, it is a 
‘shared past experience’ between all victims.
342
 
However, it is arguable that ‘victims of human trafficking’ cannot constitute a 
social group because persons react differently to victimisation and the effects of being a 
victim will vary between individuals.
343
  The broad definition of the trafficking offence 
also means that the victimisation experience could differ vastly from victim to victim – 
for one victim, the trafficking experience could include constant harm and abuse, 
while, for another, the experience could consist of simply being held captive.  It is 
submitted here that although the particularities of the victimisation experience will 
differ, certain physical and psychological effects will be prevalent in most victims, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, although possibly to varying degrees.  Furthermore, victims 
may choose not to embrace a victim identity
344
 – adopting instead a label like ‘survivor 
of human trafficking’ instead.  It therefore seems possible that victims of the offence of 
trafficking have the ability to dissociate from the group.  Over time, the effects of 
trafficking victimisation could also be treated by medication or therapy.  Thus, the 
effects of the victimisation experience that binds trafficking victims together could be 
changed or diminished.  Alternatively, it is arguable that once a person becomes a 
victim of such a devastating crime, the experiences and effects of victimisation will 
incorporate into the person’s identity and influence all future behaviour and decisions – 
                                                 
340
 UNHCR Guidelines (n 79) at para 38.  This has been successfully argued in the United Kingdom, 
Unites States and Canada – see Gallagher (n 2) at 111–15. 
341
 UNHCR Guidelines (n 79) at para 39. 
342
 This is an application of the principles enumerated in Matter of Acosta (n 332) at 233. 
343
 Fattah (n 109) at 50–1. 
344
 Gould (n 88) at 21–2. 
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whether that victim chooses to label him- or herself as such or not.  The trafficking 
victim should then not be required to change the ‘victim’ aspect of his or her identity, 
even if it is possible and beneficial to do so. 
Thus, if one bears in mind the typical victimisation effects of human trafficking 
and the impact of those effects on the victim’s identity, then it is possible for ‘victims 
of human trafficking’ to constitute a social group because of their shared experiences.  
It is therefore submitted that ‘victims of human trafficking’ can constitute a ‘social 
group’ for the purposes of the ‘refugee’ definition. 
It must be borne in mind that ‘victims of human trafficking’ can only be the 
relevant social group in certain contexts.  This is because it is illogical that victims can 
be persecuted on the basis that they are ‘victims of human trafficking’ where the 
persecution being referred to is the initial trafficking process itself.
345
  Thus, the social 
group cannot apply where persons have not yet been trafficked.
346
  The social group 
would be relevant where, for example, a victim fears re-victimisation by his or her 
traffickers upon return to the country of origin because they know that he or she has 
already been trafficked before, and is therefore a vulnerable and easy target.  The social 
group would likewise apply where the claimant fears persecution in the form of 
prosecution upon return to the country of origin.  In that case it is arguable that the 
authorities, knowing that a person has been a victim of trafficking, will specifically 
target the victim for prosecution because of the likelihood that he or she will have 
committed illegal acts during the trafficking process.  These two examples would seem 
to indicate that membership of the social group ‘victims of human trafficking’ could 
only constitute a ground upon which refugee status is to based in terms of future 
persecution, not in terms of persecution that has already happened in the past. 
Still, where the relevant persecution is exploitation that has already taken place, 
it is possible to argue that such persecution was executed because of the victim’s 
membership of a social group.  The reasoning for this is that, in terms of the trafficking 
definitions, exploitation is the end-goal of human trafficking.  In other words, if 
                                                 
345
 In other words, it does not make sense that persons would be trafficked because they were victims of 
trafficking, where they had never actually been trafficked before. 
346
 UNHCR Guidelines (n 79) at para 39. 
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persons are exploited at the end of the trafficking process, it is because they have 
reached that point by being trafficked.  But for the trafficking, they would not have 
been exploited by the persecutors in the way that they were, and the fact that they have 
been trafficked makes them vulnerable to further persecution in the form of 
exploitation.  Thus, they are exploited because they have been the victims of human 
trafficking.  Where a victim is exploited during the trafficking process, the same 
argument cannot be made because the victim would not yet be a victim of ‘trafficking’ 
if the ‘trafficking’ process is incomplete.  The victim would therefore not yet belong to 
the social group of ‘victims of human trafficking’. 
 
2.4 Alienage 
2.4.1 Being outside the country of origin 
In order to apply for refugee status in a certain country, the claimant must, at the time 
of application, be within the country from which he or she seeks asylum.  Furthermore, 
the refugee definition specifies that, in order to qualify for refugee status, a person must 
also be outside the country of his or her nationality or habitual residence (the country of 
origin).
347
  In other words, he or she must be foreign, or alien, to the country within 
which he or she claims refugee status.  In order to meet this requirement, it will be 
necessary to establish what the nationality of the claimant is.
348
  In this regard, the 
possession of a national passport serves as prima facie evidence of nationality, 
although such evidence can be refuted.
349
  Both the international and South African 
definitions of a ‘refugee’ allow refugee status to persons who are citizens of a country 
                                                 
347
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 88. 
348
 Ibid at para 89.  Where a claim has dual or multiple nationalities, art 1A(2) provides that: 
 A. ... 
 ... 
 (2) ... 
In the case of a person who has more than one nationality, the term ‘the country of his 
nationality’ shall mean each of the countries of which he is a national, and a person shall not be 
deemed to be lacking the protection of the country of his nationality if, without any valid reason 
based on well-founded fear, he has not availed himself of the protection of one of the countries 
of which he is a national. 
For a discussion of this paragraph see UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at paras 106–7. 
349
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 93. 
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of origin, that is, those who have a nationality,
350
 and also to those who are citizens of 
no country and have no nationality (stateless persons).  In the case of stateless persons, 
or where there is uncertainty about the nationality of a claimant, they must be outside 
their country of ‘habitual residence’ in order to qualify for refugee status.
351
 
Sometimes the situation arises where persons leave their homes or cannot return 
home due to a fear of persecution, but where they remain within their country of 
origin.
352
  In many cases these persons would otherwise meet the ‘refugee’ definition 
but for the fact that they did not cross the border of their country of origin.
353
  
However, alienage is a strict requirement for refugee status – with no exceptions.
354
  
Any person who is still within the territorial jurisdiction of his or her country of origin 
cannot qualify for the protection of refugee status.
355
  Thus, any persons who fear 
persecution but are still within the territory of their country of origin are classified as 
‘internally displaced persons’, (IDPs) instead of as ‘refugees’, due to the absence of the 
alienage requirement.
356
  Accordingly, South Africa would not be able to intervene 
with regards to any trafficking victims who have left their homes but are still within 
their country of origin – those victims would be deemed as IDPs and would therefore 
not enjoy the benefits of the protective status that is granted to refugees. 
States are reluctant to intervene where IDPs are concerned because entering to 
provide aid and protection to nationals who are still within the territory of their country 
of nationality would be an affront on the state sovereignty of the country concerned
357
 – 
unless the country specifically invites or condones the foreign aid to IDPs.  As a result, 
                                                 
350
 The term ‘nationality’ is taken to mean ‘citizenship’, and most refugees remain citizens in their 
countries of origin despite having asylum in another state – see UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 87. 
351
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 89.  For a discussion of the particular application of the refugee 
definition to these persons, see UNHCR Handbook at paras 101–5. 
352
 Amnesty International Refugees: human rights have no borders (London: Amnesty International 
Publications, 1997), hereafter referred to as ‘Amnesty International’, at 42. 
353
 Amnesty International (n 352) at 42. 
354
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 88. 
355
 Ibid. 
356
 Amnesty International (n 352) at 42.  However, see Shacknove (n 216), at 282, who argues that 
persons can be ‘refugees’ where they have not crossed the frontiers of their country of origin, provided 
that they are ‘within reach of the international community’ for the purposes of assistance.  For a general 
account of internally displaced persons, see Amnesty International (n 352) at 42–5.  For more 
comprehensive information about internally displaced persons, see Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee Handbook for the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons, June 2010, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4790cbc02.html [accessed 31 January 2011]. 
357
 Amnesty International (n 352) at 42. 
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these people seldom receive the protection and assistance that they need.
358
  This makes 
IDPs vulnerable to further victimisation – particularly in IDP-designated camps or 
settlements, where human rights violations frequently take place.
359
 
As observed previously in Chapter 3, the South African definition for 
‘trafficking’ encompasses trafficking acts committed ‘within or across the borders of 
the Republic’.
360
  Where victims are trafficked within South Africa, their situation 
could be analogous to persons who are internally displaced within their country of 
nationality.  Thus, although nationals of South Africa who are trafficked within the 
country’s borders could qualify as victims of human trafficking, they could not qualify 
as refugees, both in South Africa and elsewhere, and will instead be classified as IDPs.  
It must therefore be concluded that trafficking victims who have not crossed a border to 
get to South Africa before, during or after the trafficking process, are not eligible for 
refugee status – with no exceptions.  The result of this is that only foreign victims of 
human trafficking would be able to apply for refugee status in South Africa. 
From the above, it is clear that not all persons who meet the South African 
requirements for a victim of human trafficking will automatically also be able to meet 
the requirements for refugee status. Therefore, those trafficking victims who fear 
persecution but remain within their countries of origin and also those trafficking 
victims who are South African nationals will be ineligible for refugee status in South 
Africa. 
 
2.4.2 Linking persecution to the country of origin 
The alienage element furthermore requires that ‘an applicant’s well-founded fear of 
persecution must be in relation to the country of his nationality’.
361
  For example, a 
foreign national who resides in South Africa and is trafficked within the borders of 
                                                 
358
 Ibid.  Despite much international disagreement about whether to protect IDPs and how such 
protection should appropriately be provided, there has been an increasing awareness of the plight of IDPs 
in recent years – although the international response is seemingly not yet sufficient – Amnesty 
International (n 352) at 42–3. 
359
 Amnesty International (n 352) at 42–3 and 45. 
360
 Emphasis added. 
361
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 90. 
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South Africa, would not qualify for refugee status in South Africa because his fear of 
persecution is not related to his country of origin in any manner.
362
  The rationale 
behind this requirement is that if the claimant is not fearful regarding the country of 
origin, then he or she should seek protection from that country of origin.
363
  This 
requirement could have harsh implications for individuals who fear persecution from 
forces that are external to their country of origin (during military invasion, for 
example), but where the country of origin is unwilling or unable to provide such 
protection.  Fortunately, s 3(b) of the Act should provide for refugee protection in those 
types of situations.
364
  Even where s 3(b) does not apply, it is arguable that the lack of 
protection by or the occurrence of the persecutory threat within the country of origin is 
sufficient to establish a link between the feared persecution and the country of origin.  
This aspect of alienage is therefore not equivalent to a requirement that the claimant’s 
country of origin be the agent of the persecution.  
In the context of victims of human trafficking, it is arguable that the fear of 
persecution will in some way be related to the country of origin of the victim because in 
most cases the victim would have been trafficked from the country of origin.  
Furthermore, the victim may fear returning to the country of origin because of the 
potential of being harmed or re-trafficked there.  The country of origin’s inability to 
protect the victim from trafficking in the first place may also establish a link between 
the country of origin and the victim’s persecution. 
However, there may be cases where a person is trafficked from a place other 
than his or her country of origin.
365
  In those cases where there is no relation between 
the country of origin and the persecution, the trafficking victim would have to seek 
protection and assistance from his or her country of origin first as he or she would not 
be eligible for refugee status in a foreign country.  Thereafter, if the country of origin 
fails to provide protection from further persecution to the victim, there may be a claim 
                                                 
362
 Although in reality it is unlikely that the foreign national would want to remain in South Africa 
anyway, since it was the location of his trafficking victimisation. 
363
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 90. 
364
 Thus, the claimant could argue that he or she was ‘compelled to leave’ because of the state’s inability 
or unwillingness to protect him or her from ‘external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or 
events seriously disturbing or disrupting public order’. 
365
 Where, for example, a person is trafficked while vacationing or doing business in a foreign country. 
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for refugee status based on the victim’s continued fear of persecution.  South Africa 
would therefore only be able to grant refugee status to a trafficking victim who was 
trafficked from his or her country of origin.  Where the victim was trafficked from 
elsewhere, South Africa could only grant refugee status after the victim has sought 
assistance from the country of origin and protection has been found to be lacking. 
As discussed previously, persecution occurs throughout the trafficking process, 
and also sometimes after the trafficking process in the form of exploitation.  The 
protracted nature of the trafficking offence sometimes makes it difficult to establish a 
link between this persecution and the victim’s country of origin.  This is because 
persecution may occur in one, some or all of the countries of origin, transit and 
destination.  Therefore, fear of persecution in the country of destination, in other words, 
the country in which refugee status is being claimed, could also be a relevant factor, 
especially where persecution is in the form of exploitation at the end of the trafficking 
process.  If persecution is linked to the country of destination, it is unlikely that the 
trafficking victim will want to claim refugee st tus from the country of destination at 
all, but where the country of origin is unable to provide the victim with assistance and 
protection, this may be the only available option (unless status is applied for in a transit 
country).  Where all the elements are met, a link between the country of destination and 
the victim’s fear of persecution should not hinder a claim for refugee status.  However, 
the complexity of the situation could cause difficulties in the status determination 
process, so that RSDOs become reluctant to positively consider trafficking victims’ 
applications for refugee status. 
 
2.4.3 Refugees ‘sur place’ (‘on site’) 
An important aspect to consider in relation to alienage is whether the claimant for 
refugee status fled his or her country of origin because of the fear of persecution.  In the 
case of victims of human trafficking, this is unlikely to be the case because the flight of 
a trafficked person is usually involuntary or part of the trafficking process.  In other 
words, trafficking victims do not flee their country of origin, unless they are trafficked 
within the borders of their country of origin and flee subsequently to seek asylum.  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
 
83 
Sometimes, trafficking victims themselves depart from countries of origin to places 
where they are eventually trafficked and exploited, but for reasons not necessarily 
associated with persecution.  Thus, a victim may be seeking new work or study 
opportunities, or may be misled into travelling to a foreign country by the false 
promises of clandestine traffickers. 
Fortunately for victims of trafficking, the alienage element does not require that 
refugees depart the country of origin because of the fear of persecution; nor does it 
require that refugees depart using illegal methods.
366
  Instead, the forward-looking 
nature of the assessment requires that a refugee must be unwilling to return to the 
country because of a fear of persecution.
367
  This means that a person could depart the 
country of origin using valid travel methods and documents, for a reason that is 
completely unrelated to a fear of persecution, and still qualify for refugee status in the 
country of destination.  Thus, refugee law recognises the existence of a refugee ‘sur 
place’, that is, ‘[a] person who was not a refugee when he left his country, but who 
becomes a refugee at a later date’.
368
  Persons usually become refugees at a later date 
either because circumstances have changed in countries of origin since departure, 
resulting in a fear of persecution,
369
 or because of actions undertaken by or committed 
against them while they are away.
370
 
Thus, a person might become a refugee after leaving the country of origin 
where the trafficking process has commenced only subsequent to such departure.  A 
victim of trafficking may also commit certain acts while in the country of destination 
                                                 
366
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 94. 
367
 Clayton (n 235) at 433. 
368
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 94; Clayton (n 235) at 433–4. 
369
 See the case of Chaudri v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1986] 69 N.R. 114, 
where Chaudri, a Pakistani man, migrated to Canada in order to further his studies (para 2).  While he 
was in Canada, there was a violent military coup in Pakistan, which overthrew the ruling political party 
that he had been an active member of (paras 2–3).  He had even received a summons to appear in martial 
court so that he could be prosecuted for his membership (paras 4–6). Circumstances had thus drastically 
changed in his country of origin, so that he presently feared persecution (para 10), despite a lack of fear 
at the time of departure.  In these circumstances, the court held that he could qualify for refugee status (at 
para 12). 
370
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at paras 95–6.  See, for example, the South African case of Fang v 
Refugee Appeal Board and Others [2006] JOL 18635 (T), particularly at 9–10, where a Chinese national 
fathered four children while in South Africa, in breach of China’s one-child policy. 
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that put him or her at risk of future persecution.
371
  Similarly, conditions may become 
unfavourable to trafficking victims in the country of origin after departure – where a 
country would ordinarily be able to protect its nationals, factors may emerge that 
jeopardise the safe return of trafficking victims.  Thus, where the political system 
collapses while the victim is in the country of destination or the incidence of human 
trafficking cases increases significantly so that the country of origin cannot provide 
adequate protection, the victim of trafficking may qualify as a sur place refugee. 
 
2.5 Lack of protection 
The refugee definition specifies that there must be a lack of protection by the 
claimant’s country of origin.  First, protection will be deemed lacking where the person 
is unable to ‘avail himself’ of that protection.
372
  This will be the case where a claimant 
is physically unable to acquire state protection,
373
 where an effective government is 
absent,
374
 where the government refuses to give protection to claimant,
375
 or where the 
government does not have the resources to provide sufficient protection.  Essentially, 
these are all circumstances that cannot be controlled or mitigated by the refugee.
376
 
Second, protection could be lacking because the person is unwilling to ‘avail 
himself’ of state protection.  It is important to note that in this context, it is not 
impossible to obtain protection from the country of origin – it is the claimant him- or 
herself who chooses not to make use of such protection.
377
  A person may be unwilling 
to seek protection from the country of origin because he or she does not trust the 
authorities or because the government is the agent of the persecution, for example.  The 
UN Refugee Convention definition qualifies this second part of the lack of protection 
element by requiring that the claimant be unwilling to seek protection from the country 
                                                 
371
 For example, a victim could assist police in the country of destination in the investigation and capture 
of the perpetrators responsible for the trafficking. 
372
 See s 3(a) of the Refugees Act. 
373
 See Ward (n 255) at 45. 
374
 During periods of conflict or political transition, for example. 
375
 This is especially relevant if the government itself is the persecutor.  See UNHCR Handbook (n 110) 
at para 98; Hathaway (n 262) at 132.  See also Ward (n 255) at 48. 
376
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 98.  The UNHCR Handbook’s interpretation of ‘unable’ was 
accepted in the Canadian case of Ward (n 255) at 47–8. 
377
 See Ward (n 255) at 45–6 and 51. 
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of origin ‘owing to’ his or her fear of persecution.
378
  In other words, fear must be the 
claimant’s motivation for not seeking the assistance of his or her own government.  
However, the South African definition at s 3(a) uses the qualification ‘owing to such 
fear’ in relation to stateless persons, but not in relation to those with nationalities.  This 
is clearly a drafting oversight, because it results in persons with nationalities qualifying 
for refugee status where they were unwilling to seek state protection due to mere 
laziness, dislike or spite.  This contradicts the inherent rationale of refugee status – the 
protection of persons in need when their own governments cannot or will not provide 
it.
379
  Thus, the qualification should apply equally to stateless persons and those with 
nationalities. 
These two manifestations of a lack of protection by the country of origin must 
be considered holistically in terms of each claimant’s particular circumstances.
380
  In 
Rajudeen,
381
 four contexts were specified in which state protection could be found 
lacking: where the state itself is the agent of persecution, where the state condones the 
persecution, where the state tolerates the persecution, and where persecution is present 
because the state refuses or is unable to protect against it (despite not condoning or 
tolerating the persecution).
382
 
Trafficking victims may be unable to avail themselves of the protection of their 
countries of origin where those countries do not have legislation or policies in place to 
combat human trafficking and assist the victims thereof.
383
  Similarly, the country of 
origin may lack the resources and infrastructure necessary to effectively prevent and 
prosecute cases of human trafficking and to protect nationals from the effects of 
trafficking.
384
  Thus, as was the case in Mayongo (supra), the country of origin may not 
be able to provide the trafficking victim with the medication and psychological 
                                                 
378
 UNHCR Handbook (n 110) at para 100. 
379
 Ward (n 255) at 45. 
380
 Hathaway (n 262) at 129. 
381
 Zahirdeen Rajudeen v Minister of Employment and Immigration (1985) 55 N.R. 129 (F.C.A.). 
382
 These contexts take into account both ‘unwilling’ and ‘unable’ factors.  See also Hathaway (n 262) at 
129. 
383
 Gallagher (n 2) at 117; although Dauvergne (n 1) notes at 87 that where the country of origin manages 
even some success in the protection of trafficking victims upon their return, the claim for refugee status 
could be weak. 
384
 Sigmon (n 2) at 255–6. 
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treatment necessary to deal with the continuing effects of past persecution suffered, 
where such treatment is available to the victim in South Africa.
385
  In some cases, the 
country of origin may even refuse to acknowledge that the victim is need of protection 
and assistance at all, especially where it is not a party to the Palermo Protocol. 
Alternatively, trafficking victims may be unwilling to avail themselves of state 
protection where they perceive that the state is complicit in persecution feared by them, 
particularly where corrupt officials’ are involved in trafficking processes.  Victims may 
also be distrustful of or disillusioned with authorities in the country of origin because 
they did not prevent or stop the original trafficking victimisation.
386
  As a result, 
victims may be unwilling to seek protection from authorities because they fear that they 
will simply be trafficked again.  Finally, victims’ unwillingness could stem from a fear 
of persecution in the form of prosecution or punishment.  Thus, victims may be 
unwilling to seek assistance from a country of origin because they fear that doing so 
might expose them to prosecution by the country’s authorities. 
 
2.6 Summary of conclusions 
It is therefore possible for a foreign trafficking victim to meet every element for 
refugee status in South Africa.  Most past trafficking experiences will involve 
persecution of the victim in the form of human rights violations or discrimination.  
Where the effects of past victimisation are continuing or it is unsafe for the victim to 
return home, a risk future persecution can also be proven.  Where the victim’s 
subjective fear of persecution is supported by evidence that the country of origin does 
not provide adequate protection, a well-founded fear of persecution will be established.  
Many trafficking victims will fall within the social group of ‘women’ who suffer 
gender-based persecution, while another social group ‘victims of human trafficking’ 
could also be a basis for future persecution in respect of persons who have already been 
                                                 
385
 Mayongo (n 312) at para [9].  Note that the continuing effect of past persecution is relevant in 
determining a current well-founded fear of persecution.  Thus, although here the state’s lack of 
protection relates to the effects of past persecution, and not actual persecution, those effects could form 
the basis for an applicant’s fear of further future persecution. 
386
 Distrust of those in power or authority is a common effect of trafficking victimisation – Sigmon (n 2) 
at 254. 
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trafficked.  Finally, it can be shown that trafficking victims are unable to access state 
protection where adequate protection is unavailable to them or that victims are 
unwilling to do so because they fear future persecution by traffickers or the authorities. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Factors obstructing the granting of refugee status 
 
1 PARTICIPANTS IN CRIMINAL OFFENCES 
Trafficking victims could be faced with a serious obstacle when applying for refugee 
status due to their involvement in a number of criminal acts committed during the 
trafficking process, and for which they would be subject to prosecution or arrest.
387
  
Criminal offences that are usually linked to trafficking include prostitution, the 
falsification of documents, illegal migration, and the illegal entry i to a country.  Some 
victims may even become involved in the trafficking of other victims during or after 
the trafficking process, thereby becoming perpetrators themselves.  However, criminal 
acts committed by the victim should not interfere with qualification for refugee status. 
Victims of trafficking are exempted from criminal prosecution in respect of 
illegal entry or stay in South Africa, assisting another person to illegally enter or stay in 
the country, or possessing false documents.
388
  In line with the Protocol, South Africa 
has adopted a ‘victim-centred approach’ to the prosecution of the offence of human 
trafficking.
389
  This ensures that certified victims of human trafficking are not treated as 
criminals by the South African legal system.
390
    Persons functioning within the justice 
system, and administrators responsible for assessing refugee claims, should take care to 
do the same.
391
 
                                                 
387
 Snyman (n 2) at 287. 
388
 Clause 16(1) at paras (a), (b) and (c) of the Trafficking Bill. 
389
 Sigmon (n 2) at 250.  This is also the approach adopted by the United States of America in its 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000.  Like South Africa, the US allows trafficking victims to 
remain in the country while they are assisting the police in the investigation and capture of their 
perpetrators – Sigmon (n 110) at 250. 
390
 However, the Trafficking in Persons Report 2010 (n 34) indicates at 299 that some trafficking victims 
are still arrested in South Africa, and that in one case the victim was even detained in the same cell as his 
or her alleged trafficker. 
391
 In this regard, persons like police officers, prosecutors and RSDOs should refer to the Department of 
Justice and Constitutional Development Minimum standards on services for victims of crime, available at 
http://www.justice.gov.za/VC/docs/vcms/2007%20MIN%20STAND%20ENG_V2.pdf [accessed 2 
September 2010], and the United Nations General Assembly Declaration of basic principles of justice 
for victims of crime and abuse of power A/RES/40/34 (29 November 1985), available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f2275b.html [accessed 2 September 2010]. 
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Furthermore, in terms of s 21(4) of the Refugees Act, ‘no proceedings may be 
instituted or continued against any person in respect of his or her unlawful entry into or 
presence within the Republic’ where that person already has refugee status or has 
applied for asylum.  The UN Refugee Convention goes further to state that no penalties 
can be imposed for a refugee’s illegal entry into or presence in a country where three 
requirements are met: the refugee must come directly from a country where there was a 
threat to his or her life or freedom; the refugee must present him- or herself to the 
authorities without delay; and ‘show good cause’ for the illegal behaviour.
392
 
However, provided the requirements are met, these provisions could only 
exempt trafficking victims in so far as they have illegally migrated or entered to South 
Africa, via false documents or other means.  Other criminal offences committed by 
trafficking victims, may therefore result in their exclusion from qualification for 
refugee status in terms of s 4(1) of the Refugees Act.  Section 4(1)(a) of the Act 
excludes claimants from refugee status where they have committed ‘a crime against the 
peace, a war crime or a crime against humanity’.
393
  In the unlikely event that a 
trafficking victim has committed one of these international crimes, he or she will be 
excluded from refugee status.  However, it is more likely for a trafficking victim to be 
excluded in terms of s 4(2) of the Act, on the basis that he or she ‘has committed a 
crime which is not of a political nature and which, if committed in the Republic, would 
be punishable by imprisonment’.
394
  Both prostitution and offences relating to 
                                                 
392
 Article 31 of the UN Refugee Convention.  This article was interpreted in the case of R v Uxbridge 
Magistrates’ Court ex parte Adimi [2001] Q.B. 667.  With regard to the first requirement, it was held in 
Adimi that ‘coming directly’ did not preclude the refugee from stopping over in intermediate countries 
and, to an extent, choosing where to claim refugee status (at 678).  Circumstances such as the length and 
reasons for delay in an intermediate country would have to be considered (at 678).  The second 
requirement, ‘without delay’, was interpreted as not meaning ‘as soon as he arrives’, and it was 
maintained that no time restriction could be imposed (at 679).  The third requirement, ‘good cause’ was 
held to ‘be satisfied by a genuine refugee showing that he was reasonably traveling on false papers’ (at 
679).  Similar interpretations were made at a roundtable of experts co-hosted by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees – see Summary conclusions: Article 31 of the 1951 Convention (Cambridge 
University Press, June 2003), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/470a33b20.html 
[accessed April 2010].  
393
 This circumstance of exclusion is also included in art 1F(a) of the UN Refugee Convention. 
394
 This is based on the circumstance of inclusion contained in art 1F(b) of the UN Refugee Convention.  
The South African provision uses the threshold of ‘punishable by imprisonment’ where the UN Refugee 
Convention requires that the crime be ‘serious’ in order to exclude the possibility for refugee status.  The 
South African threshold is less ambiguous, as sentencing practices in relation to most crimes will be 
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trafficking cannot be said to be political is nature and could result in a sentence of 
imprisonment in South Africa.
395
 
It is important to note that a trafficking victim cannot be liable for any illegal 
act that he or she has been compelled to commit in the course of the trafficking 
process.
396
  Thus, RSDOs should also remain mindful of the fact that victims are often 
coerced or threatened into criminal behaviour in trafficking situations and that they 
may be ignorant of the fact that they are committing a crime.
397
  Thus, criminal acts 
committed during the trafficking process should not hinder the granting of refugee 
status to trafficking victims unless the act was serious enough to exclude refugee status 
and not committed under conditions of compulsion. 
 
2 SAFE THIRD COUNTRY REQUIREMENTS AND INTERNAL FLIGHT 
ALTERNATIVE 
Some countries apply a ‘safe third country’ principle before assessing the merits of 
claims for refugee status.
398
  This procedural principle maintains that where a refugee 
claimant could have obtained effective protection from persecution elsewhere, then he 
or she should apply for refugee status in that other ‘safe third country’ instead.
399
  Thus, 
many European countries decline to consider applications for refugee status where a 
claimant has had to transit through other countries and, as a result, had an opportunity 
to apply there.
400
  States also devise lists of countries considered to be ‘safe’, which fail 
to take into account the possibility of individual persecutory circumstances.
401
 
                                                                                                                                              
ascertainable from statutes and case law; whereas, the notion of ‘serious’ will require a value judgment 
on the part of the person assessing the asylum seeker’s claim. 
395
 See clauses 4–8 of the Trafficking Bill, for example. 
396
 Clause 16(1)(d) of the Trafficking Bill. 
397
 Snyman (n 2) at 287.  Ignorance could be due to linguistic and cultural barriers or a lack of 
knowledge about the relevant foreign legal system. 
398
 Goodwin-Gill (n 59) at 392. 
399
 Ibid. 
400
 Goodwin-Gill (n 59) states at 392 that the rationale for this application of the principle is that genuine 
refugees would seek asylum in the first country in which they could – any further movement is therefore 
merely for migration purposes and not for protection from persecution. 
401
 Goodwin-Gill (n 59) at 392. 
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The application of this principle to refugees is deemed incorrect by Goodwin-
Gill for three reasons: a ‘safe’ third country is not necessarily safe for all persons, 
especially where minority groups are concerned; international law does not impose any 
duty on asylum seekers to claim protection in the first country in which they can 
effectively do so; and international law does recognise a right, albeit limited, to choose 
a place of asylum, especially where other family members are already present there.
402
 
The application of this principle can be particularly problematic for trafficking 
victims because they may have transited through a number of states where there were 
opportunities to access effective protective during the trafficking process.  Fortunately, 
the South African Refugees Act does not seem to contain a safe third country principle.  
Trafficking victims will only be excluded from applying for refugee status if they 
already enjoy the protection of and reside within another country
403
 – not where they 
merely had the opportunity to enjoy protection there. 
On the other hand, the concept of internal flight alternative (‘IFA’)
404
 refers to 
the ability of potential refugees to seek effective protection from persecution in another 
part of the country of origin – in other words, to flee within the country of origin, 
without crossing an international border.
405
  Sometimes, application for refugee status 
is denied after it has been determined that there is a well-founded fear of persecution on 
the basis that there was an internal flight alternative for the potential refugee and that 
he or she ‘could reasonably [have been] expected to relocate there’.
406
 
The IFA concept is not especially relevant to trafficking victims wishing to 
apply for refugee status because victims are often not capable of controlling their 
transit during the trafficking process.  Thus, it could not be reasonably expected that 
trafficking victims would have sought protection elsewhere within their countries of 
origin, even if effective protection was available there.  IFA assessments could only be 
                                                 
402
 Ibid. 
403
 Section 4(1)(d) of the Refugees Act. 
404
 This is also sometimes referred to as ‘internal protection alternative’, or ‘IPA’. 
405
 Goodwin-Gill (n 59) at 123–4; Clayton (n 235) at 452–8. 
406
 Goodwin-Gill (n 59) at 125.  University of Michigan Law School International refugee law: the 
Michigan Guidelines on the Internal Protection Alternative (11 April 1999), available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3dca73274.html [accessed 7 February 2011], stipulates the 
international requirements and principles applicable in IFA assessments.  See also Amnesty International 
(n 352) at 78. 
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relevant in situations where, for example, trafficking victims were trafficked within 
their countries of origin and subsequently fled to seek protection in South Africa. 
 
3 DIFFICULTY WITH THE CONCEPTION OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
Human trafficking is often confused with the smuggling of persons or illegal 
immigration because the methods used by perpetrators of these crimes are often 
similar.
407
  The perpetrators of all three crimes often enter and depart countries 
unlawfully, by bribing border administrators or forging documents.
408
  However, 
human trafficking is distinguishable from the other two crimes by the fact that it ends 
in the exploitation of the person trafficked, to the benefit of the trafficker.
409
 
The confusion between human trafficking and other concepts is exacerbated by 
excessively inclusive and complicated definitions for the offence of trafficking.  Where 
there is confusion about what conduct qualifies as trafficking, there will also be 
confusion about who the victims of trafficking are.  This may either have the effect of 
denying legitimate trafficking victims their ‘victim’ status, or it may bestow such status 
on persons who are undeserving of it.  Where qualifying as a victim of human 
trafficking could provide persons with protection and assistance in the form refugee 
status, this could have serious implications.  Some trafficking victims will be denied 
the protection and assistance that they genuinely need, while state resources will be 
wasted on protecting other persons who should not actually qualify for refugee status.  
Thus, uncertainty in the understanding of the notion of human trafficking would also 
cause uncertainty in the application of the refugee definition to victims of human 
trafficking. 
There is a call for greater co-operation between government agencies, non-
governmental organisations and communities, and also amongst nation states in the 
                                                 
407
 Sigmon (n 2) at 255; Dauvergne (n 1) at 83 and 89–92.  As a result, victims of trafficking are deemed 
as perpetrators complicit in these other crimes. 
408
 Snyman (n 2) at 285. 
409
 Ibid.  In contrast, the end-goal of smuggling or illegal immigration is merely to get persons into 
another country, by evading inspection at an international border.  Once the persons have been 
transported to the country of destination the criminal act is complete, without any intention on the part of 
the perpetrators that the transported persons will continue to engage in activities that will benefit the 
perpetrators. 
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international arena.
410
  It is submitted here that co-operative efforts at the international 
level should be primarily aimed at unifying conceptions of human trafficking.  If there 
is no uniform conception of trafficking then the legislation of one state may permit 
some forms of trafficking conduct that another state’s legislation prohibits.  In the 
context of qualifying for refugee status, only a portion of human trafficking victims 
would find sympathy in the foreign country in which they end up – depending on that 
country’s attitude towards the offence of human trafficking.  Asylum seekers ordinarily 
have to contend with varying national requirements for refugee status.  Having 
different conceptions of ‘human trafficking’ too would create additional obstacles for 
trafficking victims who wish to seek asylum. 
 
4 OVERESTIMATES OR UNDERESTIMATES? 
Although many sources suggest that the magnitude of the global trafficking problem is 
immense and continuously growing,
411
 reliable data about the number of persons who 
have been trafficked is severely lacking.
412
  This deficiency has been attributed to the 
difficulties associated with researching ‘so-called hidden populations’ like victims of 
human trafficking,
413
 who are afraid to report their victimisation to the police, or who 
cannot do so because of cultural or linguistic barriers.
414
  The extent of trafficking is 
also not ascertainable because of ‘the criminal nature thereof and the organised crime 
element associated with it’ and the fact that the process often takes place across 
international borders in different legal jurisdictions over a period of time.
415
  
Sometimes organisations are responsible for perpetuating exaggerated numbers because 
it benefits their agendas to do so.
416
  Governments are furthermore blamed for a lack of 
commitment to collecting statistical data about the numbers of human trafficking 
                                                 
410
 Snyman (n 2) at 286–7; Trafficking in Persons Report 2010 (n 34) at 1.  For example, states could 
collaborate to strictly control movement across the border that exists between them.  
411
 Gould (n 88) at 21; Snyman (n 2) at 282; Sigmon (n 2) at 248–9; Jones et al (n 16) at 108. 
412
 Gould (n 88) at 22; Snyman (n 2) at 282. 
413
 Sigmon (n 2) at 248; Gould (n 88) at 22–3.  This is referred to as the ‘dark figure’ of crime statistics 
in the fields of victimology and criminology – ‘Victimisation’ in L Wolhunter et al Victimology: 
victimisation and victims’ rights (New York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2009) 33, at 34. 
414
 Sigmon (n 2) at 254; Gould (n 88) at 23. 
415
 Snyman (n 2) at 282; Gould (n 88) at 21. 
416
 Gould (n 88) at 23. 
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victimisations that occur within their jurisdictions
417
  Even where data is available, 
confusion about what ‘human trafficking’ actually is significantly skews the results.  
Researchers and journalists fail to separate trafficking conduct from actual exploitative 
conduct, as is required by the Protocol.
418
  As a result, exploitative conduct that is 
unaccompanied by any trafficking conduct is classified as ‘human trafficking’.
419
  
Thus, statistical data often conflates trafficking with smuggling, illegal immigration 
and prostitution. 
This is an issue in the context of refugee status determination because an 
underestimation of the incidence of trafficking could result in mass influxes of asylum 
seekers where the South African government is incapable of providing protection to all 
of them.  On the other hand, an overestimation of the incidence and severity of the 
human trafficking situation, both nationally and globally, could mean that a special 
status is being conferred on persons who do not actually require the critical protection 
that it is meant to provide. 
Thus, despite the possibility that trafficking victims could meet the 
requirements for refugee status, confusion about the very concept and definition of 
trafficking and whether it actually occurs as often as supposed, may provide strong 
motivation for not bestowing trafficking victims with refugee status.  This is 
particularly relevant in South Africa, where resource constraints already limit the 
ability of the government to provide effective protection to refugees. 
 
 
                                                 
417
 Sigmon (n 2) at 248.  See for example the criticisms levelled at South African governmental 
departments at a meeting of the National Assembly’s Justice and Constitutional Development Committee 
on 17 November 2010, about the Trafficking Bill and trafficking statistics by stakeholder departments – 
minutes of the meeting available at http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20101117-deliberations-cluster-
departments-combating-and-prevention-traffickin [accessed 24 November 2010]. 
418
 Snyman (n 2) at 282; Sigmon (n 2) at 255; Trafficking in Persons Report 2010 (n 34) at 298.  For 
example, trafficking is confused with smuggling, prostitution, rape or domestic violence in police 
records or charge sheets – see Justice and Constitutional Development Committee meeting minutes 
(ibid).  However, the Trafficking in Persons Report 2010 (n 34) indicates at 299 that training 
mechanisms have been implemented by the South African government to prevent confusion in this 
regard. 
419
 See for example the South African ‘trafficking’ cases discussed in the Trafficking in Persons Report 
2010 (n 34), at 298. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Conclusion 
 
While it is possible for trafficking victims to meet all the requirements for refugee 
status in some circumstances, the challenges that obstruct such qualification, 
particularly those relating to the broad conception of ‘trafficking’ and confusion 
between trafficking and other harmful or unlawful conduct, provide compelling reasons 
to ensure that refugee status is only granted to those certified trafficking victims who 
are genuinely in need of its protection. 
Uncertainty about the global scale of human trafficking also generates the 
potential for a floodgate of refugee claims in South Africa, if trafficking victims 
generally were able to qualify for refugee status.  South Africa is unlikely to be capable 
of dealing with masses of trafficking victims in addition to existing large populations of 
asylum seekers, refugees and other migrants.
420
  Resource constraints and infrastructure 
deficiencies could therefore provide powerful practical imperatives for limiting the 
refugee definition in relation to trafficking victims and for declining to provide 
trafficking victims with refugee status. 
Finally, it is important to bear in mind that even where it is possible for 
trafficking victims to qualify, refugee status will not provide absolute solutions to their 
concerns, and trafficking victims will still have to contend with difficulties ordinarily 
experienced by refugees in South Africa.  Thus, trafficking victims are likely to 
experience problems with assimilating into South African society.  They will have to 
overcome cultural, linguistic and social barriers.  Like many South Africans, they may 
struggle with poverty, unemployment, and inadequate access to housing, water, health 
care and education.  As refugees, trafficking victims are also at risk of danger in the 
                                                 
420
 See Kiliko and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2007 (4) BCLR 416 (C); [2007] 1 All 
SA 97 (C) and Tafira and Others v Ngozwane and Others (T) Case No 12960/06 (12 December 2006), 
unreported, for accounts of the strains on, and delays in, refugee status determination procedures in 
South Africa because of large numbers of asylum seekers and inefficient processing methods. 
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form of xenophobic violence and contempt.
421
  Thus, qualification for refugee status in 
South Africa could lead to further types of victimisation for victims of human 
trafficking – thereby undermining the very reason for granting refugee status to them in 
the first place. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
421
 See Anthony Minnaar ‘Victimisation and the rights of foreign migrants in South Africa’ in Linda 
Davis and Rika Snyman (eds) Victimology in South Africa (Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers, 2005) 291. 
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